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INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans are a social species.  Within the first year of life, infants demonstrate 
remarkable abilities to recognize and evaluate individuals from different social groups.  
Just 48 hours after birth, an infant appraises people and discriminates between them, 
preferring his mother’s face to that of a stranger (Pascalis, de Schonen, Morton, Deruelle, 
& Fabre-Grenet, 1995) and the sounds of mom’s native language to those of a foreign 
tongue (Moon, Cooper, & Fifer, 1993).  After just a few months of experience with 
others, infants form preferences for people based on social-group dimensions such as 
gender (Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, & Pascalis, 2002), race (Kelly et al., 2005) and 
language (Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2007).  
At the same time that infants are forming preferences for social others, they are 
also developing the skill to learn from social others.  Just hours after birth, infants 
demonstrate an amazing tendency to mimic others’ behaviors (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983) 
— an important precursor to social learning.  At a few months of age, infants recognize 
that people (but not objects) act intentionally to achieve goals (Woodward, 1998).  
Infants also use speakers’ referential social cues, such as gaze direction and pointing, to 
learn about their world (Baldwin & Moses, 2001; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993).  
Thus, by the time children enter preschool, they have honed two main social abilities: 1) 
dividing their world into social groups and evaluating people based on group dimensions; 
and 2) learning from social others.  As these social-cognitive abilities develop, it is 
plausible that social-group evaluations may affect social learning and vice versa. 
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Research indicates that social categorization and evaluation affect preschool 
children’s behavior in various ways.  For example, preschool children categorize others 
into social groups and use that information to form peer preferences, choosing to be 
friends with someone who speaks their own language (Kinzler et al., 2007), or someone 
who is simply wearing the same color t-shirt as they are (Patterson & Bigler, 2006).  
Preschool children also use social categories to guide inductive reasoning.  That is, they 
will infer that two people who share a social group based on ethnicity will have similar 
preferences (i.e., that they like the same game), even if they do not share personality 
traits (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006).  Preschoolers will also use social category 
information to decide whether or not to share a resource such as coins (Dunham, Baron, 
& Carey, 2011) and to predict interactions between social group members, such as who 
will help or harm whom (Rhodes, 2012). 
 Further, past research has established that children’s social learning skills develop 
rapidly during the preschool years.  Preschoolers use social cues (verbal, gestural, eye 
gaze) to infer people’s beliefs and knowledge states (Csibra & Gergely, 2006).  While 
using their nascent “mind-reading” skills, children are selective about the information 
they accept.  Rather than believing anything they are told, children use their experience 
with a person to determine whether he or she is a trustworthy source of relevant 
information (e.g., Koenig, Clement, & Harris, 2004). Thus, one body of research has 
focused on how social categorization affects children’s reasoning about others, and 
another group of research has tracked the development of social learning skills in 
preschoolers. However, the question of how one (social categorization) might affect the 
other (social learning) is just beginning to be explored. 
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Two studies have shown that young children are more likely to learn from an in-
group member (a native-language speaker) versus an out-group member (a foreign-
language speaker in Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, and Carpenter’s 2012 study, and a 
foreign-accented speaker in Kinzler, Corriveau, and Harris’ 2011 research).  Kinzler and 
colleagues concluded that these results reveal a general learning bias, possibly an 
evolutionary adaptation, to learn selectively from culturally in-group versus out-group 
members.  They believe a speaker’s accent/language is a key social dimension guiding 
young children’s selective learning (Kinzler et al., 2011; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007).  
If a strong genetic bias exists to selectively learn from native speakers, 
experimental results of studies examining these learning biases should be robust to 
changes in research methodology.  However, the methods used in previous research may 
have affected the results that were reported.  In Kinzler and colleagues’ (2011) study, 
children were forced to choose between information offered by an in-group and an out-
group member who were not present in the environment; rather, the stimuli (pictures of 
both individuals) were presented on video.  Video stimuli were also used in Buttelmann 
and colleagues’ research (2012).   
It is possible that young children’s proclivity to learn from social others, and their 
sophisticated ability to do so, will be apparent when out-group members are 1) the sole 
source of information and 2) present in the child’s environment.  When children actually 
meet an out-group member and that person’s contribution is not pitted against 
information offered by an in-group member, I predict that children will learn from both 
people.  Children’s learning from an out-group member who offers information face-to-
face, with no conflicting information offered by someone else (probably a more 
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ecologically valid situation than forced-choice methods using video) will cast doubt on 
the idea that evolution has endowed humans with a social-category based learning bias. 
In the first chapter of this dissertation, an overview of the research on children’s 
social categorization and evaluation will demonstrate that preschool children have the 
ability to use social categories to guide decision making (e.g., with whom to be friends) 
and to reason inductively about new group members.  
An overview of the research on young children’s selective learning follows in 
Chapter Two.  This research will show that preschool children can use a speaker’s 
personal characteristics (such as her previous accuracy) to determine whether or not she 
would be a trustworthy source of information.  However, this chapter will also highlight 
that preschoolers demonstrate this selective learning in research studies when they are 
systematically comparing two sources of information at the same time.  When a single 
person is intentionally communicating information, young preschoolers typically learn 
from her, even if she is shown to be an unreliable source.  
 Next, an overview of research in the third chapter will demonstrate that young 
children’s learning from people on video often is less efficient than their learning from 
people in their environment.  Additionally, this chapter will address the possibility that 
“live” experience with an out-group member may affect children’s preferences for her.  
Finally, in the fourth chapter of the introduction, I will review the few studies that 
have directly examined young children’s use of social category information to guide 
learning, and demonstrate how my study systematically compares methodological factors 
including: 1) whether children are forced to choose between two speakers or see one 
speaker at a time and 2) whether speakers are present in the room or on video.  These 
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comparisons will allow me to further examine whether preschool children consider a 
speaker’s social-category information when deciding whether or not to learn the 
information she presents.
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CHAPTER I 
 
 SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND EVALUATION 
 
Appreciating that the social world consists of groups of individuals who 
(supposedly) share some natural affinity and basic similarity is in fact a capacity 
that all humans with intact nervous systems possess, and a proclivity of all known 
human cultures. (LeVine & Campbell, 1972 as cited in Hirschfeld, 1988, p. 611) 
 
Hirschfeld references the work of LeVine (an anthropologist) and Campbell (a 
psychologist) to demonstrate an implicit assumption shared by both disciplines: Humans 
readily classify their social world into groups.  Social groups are formed both on 
biologically-based dimensions (e.g., kin) and on socially-constructed ones (e.g., political 
parties, sororities).  Researchers within psychology and anthropology continue to argue 
about details such as why certain social dimensions are more readily used for social 
categorization than others. Yet, it is generally accepted that all typical humans, including 
children, engage in some type of social categorization, which affects their behavior. 
One way in which preschool children use social categories is to make predictions 
about a new person based on his/her category membership.  If children know that boys 
like trains and girls like dolls, they will conclude that a new girl (whom they have never 
met) will like a doll. Children’s inductive reasoning is a key feature of what is called 
psychological essentialism (Gelman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Medin & Ortony, 1989).  
According to essentialist thinking, some categories have a “true nature that one cannot 
observe directly but that gives an object its identity, and is responsible for other 
similarities that category members share” (Gelman, 2004, p. 404).  Researchers have 
found that young children “essentialize” aspects of other individuals such as their race, 
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language and gender (Hirschfeld, 1996; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1997; Taylor, 1996). 
Studies in this area often focused on whether children consider certain social categories 
innate and fixed over time (e.g., an infant girl will grow up to be a girl even if she is 
raised on an island by all men). Yet, one study demonstrated that young children used 
social-category information (ethnicity), rather than personality traits, to inductively 
reason about new people (Diesendruck & haLevi, 2006).  The researchers used a 
common paradigm in which children were shown drawings of two characters (e.g., two 
boys) side by side, and told about a social-category trait, a personality trait, and a novel 
preference of each; for instance, one boy was Arabic (social category trait) and quiet 
(personality trait) and liked to play a novel game called zaber; the other was Jewish 
(social category) and active (personality) and liked to play a novel game called zigo.  
Next, the researcher introduced a third character who shared a social category with the 
first boy (e.g., was Arabic) and personality trait with the second (e.g., was active).  The 
researchers asked children to predict the third character’s preference by choosing the 
preference of the category-match character or the personality-match character.  Five-
year-olds made predictions about novel group members’ preferences based on social-
category (i.e., predicting that the third boy would want to play zaber because he was 
Arabic), whereas adults were more likely to use personality traits (i.e., predicting that the 
third boy would want to play zigo because he was active).  This study does not make any 
claims about whether children must consider a social category “innate and fixed” in order 
to guide inductive reasoning, however it does demonstrate one functional way that young 
children use social-category information: To make predictions about new people’s 
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preferences. Thus, it is plausible that children might use social-group membership to 
make predictions about someone’s trustworthiness in providing information.   
However, when young children have to decide whether or not to learn from 
someone they are not just reasoning about a third party; they are now directly involved in 
the situation and their reliance on social categorization therefore may differ. For example, 
if a young Arabic child were introduced to two characters (an Arabic boy who wanted to 
teach him to play a new game called zigo, and a Jewish boy who offered different 
information about how to play the same game), would that child still rely on social-
category membership to make a decision about his own learning? Further, would his use 
of social-category membership differ if he was offered information by only the Jewish 
child (whose information therefore did not conflict with anyone else’s)?  Very little 
research thus far has investigated whether children may use social-category membership 
when making decision about their own learning. 
In another area of social-categorization research, psychologists have focused on 
how children’s social-category evaluations result in in-group preferences (and possibly 
prejudiced behaviors).  Typically, researchers present children with photographs or 
videos of unknown children who differ along a dimension of interest (e.g., race, gender, 
language).  Children’s preferences for individuals from one group versus another are then 
assessed.  In experimental studies, 3-to-5-year old majority race (white) children 
preferred to play with children of their own race (Kircher & Firby, 1971) and 4-to-10-
year-olds preferred same-gender children (Martin, 1989).  Five-year-old monolingual 
French and English children preferred to be friends with native speakers (Kinzler et al., 
2007), a preference that extended to native-accented speakers (Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, 
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& Spelke, 2009).  Two-and-a-half-year-olds (presumably too young to reason in the 
abstract about friendship choices) preferred to exchange toys with native-language 
speakers who appeared on video (i.e., toys came out of tubes attached to the television — 
Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 2012).  
The social evaluation research therefore suggests that children “like” people who 
are similar to them. And yet, people differ on a variety of dimensions. Do children 
consider some social dimensions more important than others? Indeed, researchers have 
found that children prioritize certain social category dimensions when making friendship 
choices. For example, 5-year-olds consistently prioritized gender and age over race, 
choosing to play with objects or activities endorsed by own-gender/other-race children 
and own age/other race children over those endorsed by children of their own race who 
were a different age or gender (Shutts, Banaji, & Spelke, 2010). When accent was pitted 
against race, 5-year-olds reliably preferred own-accent/other-race speakers over foreign-
accent/own-race speakers (Kinzler et al., 2009). These studies demonstrate that children 
reliably use social-category dimensions, and systematically prioritize certain dimensions 
(e.g., gender and accent over race) to form preferences for in-group members.  
 Besides social categories such as gender or accent, however, a large body of 
research has demonstrated that completely arbitrary social categories can also affect 
children’s group-based preferences. Distinctions as minimal as having different group 
shirt colors (Patterson & Bigler, 2006), whether one group is shown to be “lucky” (Olson, 
Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006), or simply being randomly assigned to groups with no 
other distinctions (Dunham et al., 2011; Tajfel 1970), can affect young children’s 
evaluation of group members. In these studies, researchers have measured children’s 
5 
 
preferences (who do they “like” better), resource allocation (who do they share with), and 
reasoning about novel group members. For example, in one study in which groups were 
randomly assigned, 5-year-olds preferred to share coins with in-group members versus 
out-group members (Dunham et al., 2011). In another study, 3-to-5-year-olds were 
randomly assigned to a “blue” or “red” team in their classroom, and children 
demonstrated in-group preferences in their ratings of how much they would like to play 
with peers from their class, as well as unknown group members dressed in red or blue 
shirts (Patterson & Bigler, 2006).  
The fact that minimal-group distinctions can easily lead to preferences for an “in-
group” suggests that what may appear as “natural” category biases emerging from 
evolutionary adaptations could result instead from a more general categorization bias. 
Bigler and Liben (2007) support this conclusion: 
Given the vast diversity of potentially important categories and the complexity of 
the cues that mark such categories, we reject the idea that evolution “hard-wired” 
specific dimensions as salient bases for classification. We instead suggest that 
evolution led to a flexible cognitive system that motivates and equips children to 
infer — from environmental data — which bases of classification are important 
within a given context. (p. 163) 
 
Thus, children may have a general categorization bias, through which specific categories 
may be prioritized depending on the situation, rather than an evolutionary adaptation that 
biases them to rely on specific social categories to guide reasoning. 
Kinzler, Shutts, and Correll (2010) acknowledge that humans are flexible in terms 
of prioritizing even arbitrary social categories depending on the context (e.g., “If living in 
Boston, being a Red Sox fan may be a notable social category”, p. 582). They note, 
however, that numerous social psychological studies have shown gender, age, and race to 
be particularly robust in guiding children and adults’ social reasoning. The authors take a 
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different stance than Bigler and Liben (2007) by suggesting evolution may have endowed 
humans to prioritize certain “deeply rooted” social dimensions when reasoning about 
social groups (p. 583).  
Kinzler et al. (2010) argue that language and accent should also be considered one 
of the major dimensions guiding social-category reasoning. This claim is based on their 
previous research demonstrating infants’ and children’s preferences for native-language 
and native-accent speakers over foreign speakers (Kinzler et al., 2007, 2009). The authors 
note that, “infants and young children may be predisposed to grant particular attention to 
the language with which others speak in guiding their social interactions” (Kinzler et al., 
2010 p. 585), because “social preferences and reasoning based on accent may have 
origins in cognitive evolution” (Kinzler et al., 2011, p. 110). Kinzler and colleagues are 
not the first to suggest humans’ reasoning about social groups has roots in evolution 
(Geary & Bjorklund, 2000; Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides 1992) 
although suggesting a particular predisposition to focus on language and accent makes 
their claim one of the more specific. Debate continues as to whether children reason 
about social groups from a general cognitive mechanism adapted through evolution or 
one specific to certain social dimensions (see also, Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004). Further 
research on the situational specifics in which young children rely on certain social 
categories such as language to guide social interactions will help to determine the 
plausibility of evolutionary claims. It is important to note that Kinzler and colleagues 
(2011) do not suggest evolution has bestowed children with a hard-wired rule to only 
learn from linguistic in-group members across any situation; rather, they suggest this may 
be children’s default mechanism — that children will do so unless there is clear 
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environmental input to do otherwise (e.g., if a foreign-speaker is shown to be an expert in 
a particular domain or if a child is in a novel foreign environment – p. 110). 
One way to investigate how strictly children rely on certain “high-priority” social 
categories to guide social interaction is to examine situations in which children do not 
rely on a social category to guide reasoning.  Flexibility in children’s use of social 
categories would weaken the argument that evolution has endowed children with a 
mechanism that automatically guides their decision-making. Social learning scenarios 
offer insight into whether children call a speaker’s social-category to mind when deciding 
whether to accept information she provides. For instance, Kinzler and colleagues (2007; 
2011) argue that children will use language to guide reasoning about who is a trustworthy 
source of information.  
Spelke and Kinzler (2007) theorize that humans have innate “core knowledge” 
systems for representing objects, actions, number, space and social partners.  They 
suggest that core representations of number guide young children in learning how to 
count (e.g., Wynn, 1990, as cited in Spelke & Kinzler, 2007) and that a core 
representation of social partners may similarly guide cultural learning (defined following 
Tomasello, 1999) as, “acquisition of skills and behaviors that sustain life within a 
particular human group” (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007, p. 92).  A core system to guide 
learning about people (e.g., inductive reasoning from one group member’s behavior to 
another’s) might be plausible.  However, Tomasello focused on human cultural learning 
from other people, compared to the non-social learning of non-human species, not on 
specific ethnic or regional cultures within humanity.  It has only been in the last few 
years that his research group has focused on the personal or social characteristics of 
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particular human teachers, such as their social-category membership (e.g., Buttelmann et 
al., 2012; Over & Carpenter, 2012; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2012).  
To date, it is an open question whether young children’s social cognitive skills to 
learn efficiently from the people around them apply only to cultural in-group members.  
Throughout history, young children have typically had primary contact with, members of 
their own cultural group.  It is possible that children may not learn from an out-group 
member (based on an “important” social category) in their environment.  Or it may be 
that if children are directly exposed to an out-group member, social learning from the 
person will proceed as usual.  That is, when presented with an out-group member face-to-
face, social learning skills may overcome any hesitation a young child might feel about 
learning from someone they have categorized as “not the same as me”.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 SOCIAL LEARNING 
 
The capacity to learn by observation enables people to acquire large, integrated 
patterns of behavior without having to form them gradually by tedious trial and 
error. 
 
Here, Bandura (1977, p. 12) points out one benefit of social learning compared to direct 
exploration: not having to learn everything in the “school of hard knocks”.  Obviously, 
adults and children learn by directly interacting with the environment as well as by taking 
advantage of the knowledge of others.  During development, much of children’s learning 
takes place through social interactions in a particular social-cultural environment 
(Vygotsky, 1978).  Young children typically spend most of their time being supervised 
by and exposed to social others who frequently provide information in the form of speech 
and observable behavior.  Due to the sheer volume of input, it is likely that children use 
some sort of judgment or bias to guide learning.  But: How do they determine when and 
from whom to learn?  Researchers have suggested a “pedagogical” theory of social 
learning in which “teachers” provide ostensive cues such as eye contact, pointing, and 
infant-directed speech to signal that they are sharing information relevant to the recipient 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2006, p. 250).  Tomasello acknowledged the importance of social 
“cues” and additionally argued that social learning relies on children’s ability to 
understand another person’s intentions (Tomasello, 1999).  This skill to discern others’ 
intentions and learn from them is fundamental to human social cognition and may be so 
ingrained in typically-developing preschoolers that it will supersede any hesitation 
children might have about taking information from a social out-group member.  
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Many researchers have experimentally demonstrated that young children rapidly 
and efficiently acquire knowledge based on this ability to understand another person’s 
intentions.  For example, when learning new words, toddlers are quite skilled at 
discerning a person’s referential intentions to accurately map a new label to a novel 
object rather than simply relying on temporal associations between an offered label and 
whatever he or she happens to be observing at the time.  If a toddler is looking at a toy 
when she hears her mother say “whisk,” the child will not automatically assume that the 
word “whisk” is the label for the toy.  Rather, she will look to her mother’s face and 
follow the direction of her gaze to determine what Mom intended to label.  Baldwin 
(1993) found that toddlers have a strong tendency to seek out and use a speaker’s 
referential intentions to learn a new word; in a situation like the one with the whisk, they 
look to a speaker’s face, follow her gaze direction, and accurately map her label onto the 
proper referent.  Even if the whisk is in a drawer during labeling, but then her mother 
pulls out an unusual wire object, looks satisfied, and begins to use it, toddlers will 
accurately map the label “whisk” to the proper object (e.g., Akhtar & Tomasello, 1996).  
Toddlers are flexible in their reasoning about a person’s intentions: When a particular cue 
(e.g., information about gaze direction) is uninformative, they adaptively use any of a 
variety of communicative cues (such as emotional expressions) that may be available 
(Tomasello & Barton, 1994; Tomasello, Strosberg, & Akhtar, 1996).  
Understanding another person’s intentions also supports children’s learning about 
objects and their copying of new behaviors.  For example, 14-to-18-month-olds will learn 
a novel action from a person who demonstrates the action intentionally (saying “There!” 
upon completion of the action) but not from someone who completed the action 
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accidentally (saying “Whoops!” — Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998).  Meltzoff 
(1995) similarly demonstrated that 18-month-olds will imitate an intended, rather than 
accidental action on an object.  In this study, one end of a dumbbell-shaped toy could be 
removed. One group of toddlers saw the adult demonstrate a complete action (pulling off 
one side of the dumbbell) whereas another group saw the adult attempt but fail to 
complete the action (his hand repeatedly slipped off the end).  Toddlers in both groups 
imitated the intended, completed action.  In an important follow up, toddlers did not 
produce the completed action when a mechanical object rather than a human failed to 
complete the action (Meltzoff, 1995).  This research suggests that toddlers use, not just 
perceptual information, but a more complex intention-based understanding of a human’s 
actions to guide their behavior.   
In fact, the copying of a person’s actions following social learning is so strong 
that children often imitate a speaker’s inefficient or unusual actions if they are 
intentional.  That is, children “over-imitate” by faithfully copying all of a speaker’s 
intentional actions, even if they are not necessary to achieve a goal (e.g., Lyons, Young, 
& Keil, 2007; Nielsen, 2006).  In these studies, an actor typically demonstrates either an 
inefficient action (e.g., the first step of a two-step process is superfluous) or an unusual 
one (e.g., turning on a light with one’s forehead).  Children imitate the person’s exact 
actions based on their perception of the demonstrator’s intent.  For instance, children 
only turned on a light with their heads after watching a person do so whose hands were 
free, but not when a justification for the strange action was offered (e.g., he turned on a 
light with his head because his hands were full — Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; 
Meltzoff, 1988).  Children’s tendency to “over-imitate” has been demonstrated in 
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multiple age groups in many laboratories, as well as with Kalahari Bushman children in 
southern Africa (Nielsen & Tomaselli, 2010).  This research suggests children’s over-
imitation might be a pervasive, robust human behavior that would not happen solely in 
response to the behavior of an in-group member but might transcend culture.  Research 
also demonstrates that the tendency to over-imitate increases as children get older and 
that even college students exhibit this behavior (McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011; 
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn & Horner, 2007).  Thus, over-imitation is not a learning 
“mistake” made only by young children, but rather an entrenched social-learning 
behavior, which even adults exhibit. 
By the preschool years, children have extensive practice in using others’ 
intentional cues to learn information about their world.  However, they are not passive 
recipients of any and all intentionally presented information; rather, they are developing 
“epistemic vigilance” (Sperber et al., 2010).  That is, preschoolers critically assess 
whether a communication partner is likely to provide true and useful information.  
There are several traits one might consider when someone offers information:  Do 
I know this person?  Has she been accurate in the past?  Is she an “expert” in a given 
field?  Certain characteristics of a speaker, such as previous accuracy, are closely related 
to whether children should learn from her.  However, researchers have begun to 
investigate whether characteristics more distal to a person’s knowledge base, such as 
personality traits (e.g., honesty, kindness) influence children’s judgment.  A few groups 
of researchers have also begun to examine whether a person’s social category (based on 
her spoken language) affects whether children will learn from her (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 
2012; Kinzler et al., 2011).  Before delving into the specifics of the social-category based 
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learning studies, it will be helpful to consider how methodological factors may influence 
the conclusions that can be drawn from research on children’s selective trust in 
information sources. 
 In these studies, children typically are presented with a scenario in which a 
speaker is shown to be a trustworthy informant by accurately labeling familiar objects, 
compared to an  “untrustworthy” speaker who is shown to be inaccurate (e.g., labeling a 
shoe, “duck”).  When the two speakers subsequently present conflicting information 
about a novel object label, children use their knowledge of the speakers’ previous 
accuracy to preferentially learn from the trustworthy speaker.  Children’s ability to 
critically assess a speaker’s knowledge state develops during the preschool years.  Three-
year-olds, for example, were perfectly willing to learn from someone who had repeatedly 
mislabeled objects just moments before, whereas 4 and 5-year-olds preferred to learn 
from the trustworthy speaker (Koenig & Harris, 2005).  Later studies included task 
modifications such as increasing the salience of the speaker’s inaccuracy and providing 
verbal reminders of who had been accurate; in those scenarios, 3-year-olds preferred to 
learn from the accurate speaker (Pasquini, Corriveau, Koenig, & Harris, 2007).  Three-
and four-year-old children also learned novel object functions from someone who was 
previously accurate about typical functions for common objects (Birch, Vauthier, & 
Bloom, 2008). Around the same time, 4- and 5-year-olds are developing a basic 
understanding that different people may be experts and have knowledge in different 
areas; for example, a doctor will know about biological things whereas a car mechanic 
will know about mechanical things (Lutz & Keil, 2002).  Children are also flexible at 
disengaging from one salient trait (a speaker’s age) to focus on a trait that appears related 
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to expertise to guide learning. For example, preschool children preferred to learn about a 
new toy from a child rather than an adult (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009).  
Children also prefer to learn from a speaker based on characteristics that are not 
as directly relevant to her knowledge base.  For example, children preferred to learn from 
a familiar speaker over an unfamiliar speaker; 3-year-olds continued to do so even when 
the familiar speaker was shown to be inaccurate, whereas 4 and 5 year olds’ moderated 
their trust in the familiar speaker based on her accuracy (Corriveau & Harris, 2009).  
Even 3-year-olds preferentially learned from a “nice” puppet (one who caressed the 
researcher) rather than a “mean” one (who hit the researcher — Mascaro & Sperber, 
2009; see also Doebel & Koenig, 2013).  By age 4, children used a speaker’s truthfulness 
(Vazquez, DeLisle, & Saylor, 2013) or niceness/honesty (Lane, Wellman, & Gelman, 
2012) to guide word learning.  At least by the age of four, children appear to consider a 
speaker’s accuracy and knowledge, as well as certain personality traits, to determine 
whether she is a trustworthy source of information.  Thus it is plausible that children may 
rely on information about a speaker’s social category to determine whether or not to learn 
from her.  
It is important to note that in all of these studies, children were forced to choose 
between two speakers.  This methodological choice must be considered before drawing 
conclusions about children’s rejection of particular classes of individuals as completely 
untrustworthy sources of information.  Children’s preference to take information from 
speaker A over speaker B does not automatically imply that children are unwilling to take 
information from speaker B.  Children may simply believe choosing Speaker A is the 
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“correct” answer in this paradigm, but would be perfectly willing to learn from Speaker B 
if she were the sole source of information.  Recent research supports the latter conclusion.  
Before the age of 5, children’s default response to an informant appears to be 
credulity; they believe what someone tells them — even when they are explicitly 
informed that a speaker is untrustworthy.  Several research groups have demonstrated 
that young children have great difficulty rejecting intentionally communicated 
information.  For instance, after being introduced to a “helper” and a “tricker,” children 
saw separate videos of each speaker telling a third person where to find a desired, hidden 
object.  Importantly, children were not forced to choose between the two speakers. After 
each video, children could choose to accept or reject that speaker’s information in 
searching for the object themselves.  Three-year-olds searched the location they were told 
by both the “helper” and the “tricker”; only by age 5, did children selectively follow the 
advice of the “helper” and disregard the advice of the “tricker” (Vanderbilt, Liu, & 
Heyman, 2012).  Jaswal and colleagues (2010) demonstrated that 3-year-olds’ proclivity 
to trust what a person tells them is so strong they rarely do otherwise, even when a 
speaker has consistently offered inaccurate information just moments before.  In this 
study, children were again attempting to find the location of a hidden sticker (if they 
found the sticker, they got to keep the sticker, but if they searched in the wrong location, 
the speaker got to keep it).  When the speaker verbally announced the wrong location, 
children continued to search, trial after trial, in her designated (incorrect) location.  Over 
half the children acted on her incorrect verbal information on all 8 trials, never once 
successfully finding the sticker.  Having a speaker simply point (with no verbal 
information) to the incorrect location was similar to the offer of verbal testimony; 
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children were unable to disregard this familiar, intentionally-communicated information 
(Palmquist & Jaswal, 2012).  Heyman and colleagues (2012) tested over 200 preschoolers 
with similar results; children had difficulty rejecting a speaker’s incorrect information 
when it was not directly pitted against another informant’s information.  Overall, these 
results support the hypothesis that preschool children have great difficulty rejecting 
information that is intentionally communicated by other people.  Therefore, if a social 
out-group member is intentionally providing information that is not directly pitted against 
an in-group member’s information, young children’s “default” to learn from a single 
source may override any social-category based biases. 
Another factor to consider is whether children recognize the differing importance 
of social group in deciding whether particular information is relevant to them.  Do 
children recognize that some types of information (e.g., an object label) are specific to 
certain social groups, whereas other information (e.g., an object function) may or may not 
be specific to certain groups and some information (e.g., fire is hot) is objectively true 
and not group-specific at all?  Do children expect all intentionally- communicated 
information to be relevant to them, regardless of who offers the information?  In this 
regard, researchers have begun to examine children’s developing understanding of 
“conventional knowledge.”  Basing their definitions on the work of Lewis (1969), 
Diesendruck and Markson (2011, p. 189) describe conventional knowledge as socially-
communicated information that is arbitrary, “community-bound (as opposed to 
idiosyncratic or universal)….and prescriptively powerful…(as opposed to completely 
flexible).”  Language is a clear example of conventional knowledge.  There is nothing 
inherent in the word “dog” that links it to its four-legged referent — this set of sounds is 
17 
 
merely the agreed upon or “conventional” label for English speakers (e.g., see Clark, 
2007).  Language offers a clear example that conventionality exists within a particular 
social group — while “dog” is conventional for English speakers, the label, “perro” is 
conventional for Spanish speakers.  Kalish and Sabbagh (2007) suggest several additional 
domains in which information may be conventional, such as object function and 
categorization, social interaction expectations, and rules of a game.  Children may 
assume when they see a novel behavior that this is how “those in the know” (i.e., older 
people) do it.  For example, when children see someone intentionally use a two-step 
process to open a box (even if they can see that one step is causally unnecessary), they 
may repeat it because they believe the process is “the proper way” to open the box, rather 
than an idiosyncratic behavior particular to the demonstrator. 
Diesendruck and Markson (2011) note that children have a “liberal” assumption 
of conventionality, particularly for information that is presented intentionally and 
consistently within and across individuals (see also Wohlgelernter, Diesendruck, & 
Markson, 2010).  However, during the preschool years, children do develop some 
flexibility in reasoning about the shared nature of different types of information — that 
is, they understand that while common noun labels are likely to be shared (e.g., “dog”), 
proper noun labels (e.g., a dog named “Rover”) are not (Diesendruck, 2005).  Similarly, 
preschoolers do not expect people to share knowledge of arbitrary facts about an object 
(e.g., “my uncle gave this to me” — Diesendruck & Markson, 2001).  Thus preschool 
children are able to distinguish between information that is likely to be shared by others 
and idiosyncratic information.  In the domain of object function, preschoolers show 
similar flexibility. Children expect typical object functions to be shared by others in their 
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community (Casler & Kelemen, 2005), however by age 5 they realize that although there 
may be one conventional use, objects can be used in multiple, novel ways (Birch et al., 
2008; Defeyter, Hearing, & German 2009).  Thus, it is plausible that preschoolers may be 
able to distinguish between information that is likely to be shared among social groups, 
and information that may be culturally bound to certain groups.  
Whether or not information is likely to be conventional could certainly play a role 
in how and when children use a speaker’s social-category membership to guide learning.  
Accordingly, researchers have begun to question who children consider to be trustworthy 
sources of conventional information.  Kalish and Sabbagh (2007) note, “It remains an 
open question how children identify the best informants about conventional knowledge” 
(p. 7).  Diesendruck and Markson (2011) also theorize about cues children may use to 
determine whether someone will be a good source of conventional knowledge and 
suggest the possibility that “the development of social categories aid children in 
recognizing relevant purveyors of conventional knowledge” (p. 193).  They go on to note 
that, “an early differentiation between in- and out-groups may be functionally adaptive 
not only for the sake of identifying potential foes but also for recognizing potential 
‘teachers’” (Diesendruck & Markson, 2011, p. 193).  Therefore it is possible that children 
may use social-category information to guide learning of conventional information.  
However, the question remains: Do preschool children have the capability to distinguish 
between information that is clearly conventional (a new word) and information that may 
or may not be conventional (a novel use of an object)? Further, can they use a speaker’s 
social-category information to appropriately guide learning? 
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In summary, preschool children tend to learn from people when they are the sole 
source of information.  Children also appear to have a default assumption that 
information (when intentionally-presented) is conventional.  In the current research, I 
examine how young children react when faced with a speaker from a social out-group 
who is intentionally offering information that may or may not be conventional (e.g., 
object function).  Will children use social category membership to decide whether to trust 
an out-group speaker’s information (as some researchers have claimed) or will a social 
learning “default” lead children to learn from her despite her out-group status, especially 
if her information does not conflict with an in-group member’s information? 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 DIRECT EXPERIENCE AND VIDEO 
 
There is one final factor to consider in an examination of whether young children 
rely on social-category membership to guide learning: whether children are offered 
information by an out-group member that is present in the room or one who is on a video.  
Many studies investigating both social evaluation and children’s trust in information 
sources have used drawings, photos or videos to present social stimuli.  Researchers, if 
they acknowledge this decision at all, typically mention that using symbolic media allows 
for greater control of extraneous variables than using “live” stimuli (which is certainly 
true).  In using symbolic media to represent social partners, however, researchers are 
assuming that children will reason in the same way they would after seeing a real person 
in their environment.  This may not be the case for very young children.   
Researchers studying young children’s social categorization have often used 
symbolic media to assess children’s subsequent evaluations and in-group preferences.  
Using photographs or videos of social group members is a valid method that allows 
researchers to answer questions about how children assess a group by combining 
responses to multiple individuals over a short period of time, which would be difficult to 
achieve with real people present in the lab.  When considering a social dimension, 
however, it should be acknowledged that children’s experience with a person who is in 
the room might affect their in-group preferences.  It is possible that positive experience 
with an out-group member could lead to increased preference for that person and perhaps 
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extend to other members of her social group, thus ameliorating in-group preferences.  On 
the other hand, direct experience with an out-group member may be disconcerting to 
young children who have had no prior experience with this sort of person.  In this case, 
video may provide “psychological distance” (DeLoache, 2000) from the person, 
rendering the experience a safe one.  If “live” experience happens to be aversive to young 
children, we might expect them to show an in-group preference after real, direct 
experience with an out-group member.  
The mere presence of foreign speakers in one’s environment does not appear to 
eliminate preferences; 5- to 11-year-olds who grew up in South Africa surrounded by 
many different languages still preferred their own language (Kinzler, Shutts, & Spelke, 
2012).  However, native Xhosa-speaking children who attended an English-speaking 
school preferred English speakers to Xhosa speakers (Kinzler et al., 2012).  Thus own-
language preferences may be overcome through close contact with a foreign-language 
speaker (e.g., a teacher or caregiver).  The same appeared to be the case for race-based 
preferences.  Three-month-old African infants raised in a Caucasian environment 
preferred to look at Caucasian faces (i.e., the race with which they had the most 
experience) over African faces (Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, & Hodes, 2006).  Both of these 
studies with children and infants demonstrate amelioration of social preferences based on 
extensive, (presumably positive) experiences with classmates, teachers and parents. 
  It is an open question what quantity and quality of social experience is necessary 
to reduce young children’s own-group biases, though this is an area social psychologists 
continue to investigate (e.g., see Crisp & Turner, 2009 for an argument for “imagined 
contact” and Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 2006 for a study of vicarious 
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experiences).  For example, would simply seeing an out-group member face-to-face in a 
brief, positive demonstration be enough to get rid of in-group preferences?  Or would 
young children be surprised and put off by the novel situation of interacting with an out-
group member? 
One recent study supports the idea that live experience (without familiarity) can 
affect preferences: after watching/listening to two people who were present, 19-month-
old children demonstrated no preference for a native-language speaker over a foreign-
language speaker (that is, they chose equally between objects belonging to the two 
speakers — Howard, Henderson, Miller, & Woodward, 2011).  Simply knowing that a 
foreign speaker is a real person capable of interaction, whose presence is accepted by the 
experimenters and parents, may signal to young children that the foreign-speaker is 
equally worthy of acceptance as the own-language speaker.   
In addition to preferences, children’s learning may also be affected by the 
presence of a speaker. Research indicates that infants’ and toddlers’ social learning 
(including imitation and word learning) typically is better when they interact with a 
person in their environment rather than merely watching them on video (e.g., Anderson & 
Pempek, 2005; Barr & Hayne, 1999; Roseberry, Hirsh-Pasek, Parish-Morris, Golinkoff, 
2009; Troseth, Saylor & Archer, 2006; see Barr, 2010, and Troseth, 2010 for extensive 
reviews of the literature).  Although by the age of three, children are more successful at 
learning from a person on video, they may still learn better from someone in their 
environment.  For example, 3-year-olds imitated the exact actions of someone present in 
their environment but not someone on television (McGuigan et al., 2007).  In other 
studies, older preschoolers had difficulty using information from video in various ways 
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(e.g., recognizing themselves on a delayed video — Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996 
— and finding objects hidden in an adjoining room — Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 
1999).  Children of this age needed parental support to learn words and story content 
effectively from video (Strouse, O’Doherty, & Troseth, in press).  
One reason children may learn better directly from people than from video 
presentations is that a person on TV typically does not actually interact with the viewer.  
Thus, children may not consider someone on video to be a social partner and they may 
not assume that watching a video is a “pedagogical situation” in which a person may 
share relevant information (Csibra & Gergely, 2006).  In studies in which a person on 
video actually interacted with viewers (via closed-circuit television), 2-year-old children 
learned: They imitated exactly what the person on TV did and followed her directions 
(Nielsen, Simcock & Jenkins, 2008; Troseth et al., 2006).  McGuigan et al., (2007) 
attributed the failure of 3-year-olds to imitate a demonstration on video to the fact that 
their "socially degraded" video presentation showed only the demonstrator’s hands (p. 
362).  Three-year-olds who saw the same behaviors demonstrated “live” had no problem 
learning them.  These results suggest that even 3-year-olds may still rely on the presence 
of a real person offering typical social cues of intentionality (such as those carried by the 
eyes and facial expression) and reciprocal interaction in order to realize that the person is 
offering relevant information that they could learn.  
In previous chapters, I examined how young children might use a speaker’s 
social-category information to determine if she is a trustworthy source. I argued that 
young children’s entrenched social learning skills might overcome hesitation about 
learning from an out-group member when she is the sole source of information.  But the 
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use of video brings an added dimension.  The research on young children’s difficulty 
learning from video suggests that seeing an out-group member in one’s own 
environment, versus on video, would increase the likelihood that children would learn 
from her.  An out-group member’s appearance on video (where she might not be viewed 
as a viable social partner) might add a “second strike” against the possibility that young 
children would learn from her.  In fact, one study has shown that infants who repeatedly 
meet a foreign speaker do learn language information from her, whereas infants who only 
see the foreign speaker repeatedly on video do not (Kuhl, Tsao, & Liu, 2007).  
It is an open question how 3- and 5-year-old preschoolers’ social learning would 
be affected by an out-group speaker’s presence “in person” versus on video.  In the 
following chapter, I will describe several studies on social learning from an out-group 
speaker that used either “live” or pictorial (video or photographs) stimuli.  No studies 
have directly compared the two.  By systematically comparing preschool children’s 
learning from an out-group speaker who is present in the room versus one on video, we 
can answer questions about the presence and strength of children’s learning biases.  Many 
of the studies purporting to show learning biases have used pictorial stimuli and have 
pitted an in-group member against an out-group member.  If children learn from an out-
group member who is present (but not on video), it would suggest that a person’s 
presence might play a more significant role in children’s learning than her out-group 
status.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LANGUAGE-BASED LEARNING BIASES AND THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
Researchers have begun to investigate whether young children selectively learn 
from cultural in-group members.  In these studies, a speaker’s foreign language or accent 
serve as the social trait of interest; one shown to be salient to young children in the 
formation of in-group preferences, and one which may be a valid cue for determining 
cultural in-group versus out-group members.  Kinzler and colleagues (2011) first 
investigated whether social preferences for native- accented speakers might also guide 
selective learning.  In this study, speakers demonstrated their native or foreign accent by 
reading briefly from a Curious George storybook.  Next, the speakers silently 
demonstrated two different functions for a novel object and participants had to choose 
which function to endorse.  Five-year-olds selectively endorsed novel object functions 
demonstrated by a native-accented speaker versus a foreign-accented speaker.  The 
authors suggested that “children demonstrate selective trust in information provided by 
members of their own native cultural group over nonmembers, even when information 
does not rely on linguistic communication” (italics added, p. 110).  
There are several important aspects of this study.  First, children demonstrated 
own-language learning biases for ambiguously conventional information (object 
function).  Additionally, children showed a native-speaker bias even when the authors 
controlled for speaker comprehensibility by having both speakers read nonsense words 
from the Lewis Carroll story, Jabberwocky (each in her own accent).  Thus, the results of 
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this study suggest that children use information about a speaker’s linguistic social 
category (not simply comprehensibility) to determine if she is a trustworthy source of 
(even non-linguistic) information.  However, in this study both speakers were on video 
and young children were forced to choose between them.  Would children similarly 
dismiss information from a foreign speaker if that information did not conflict with what 
a native speaker said?  And what if the foreign speaker were present in the room?  Would 
children readily dismiss a foreign speaker’s information if she sat across from them and 
presented it?  
In a between-subject design, in which children were not forced to choose between 
two speakers, 14-month old infants demonstrated a similar learning bias for native 
speakers (Buttelmann et al., 2012).  In this study, one group of infants saw a native 
speaker demonstrate unusual actions, and another group of infants saw a foreign speaker 
do the same.  Fourteen-month-olds were more likely to imitate unusual actions of an 
own-language speaker than unusual actions of a foreign speaker, a result lending support 
to Kinzler’s theory that young children use a speaker’s language to guide learning, even 
of non-linguistic information.  Both authors conclude that children are “cultural” learners 
who preferentially take information from cultural in-group members.  Yet Buttelmann et 
al.’s speakers were on video, and learning rates overall were low (46% of infants 
endorsed the novel action of the in-group speaker, 21% endorsed the action of the out-
group speaker).  Although children attended equally to the in-group and out-group 
presentations, it is possible that part of their difficulty in imitating the foreign speaker’s 
action was because he was on video.  Would the infants have imitated the foreign speaker 
if he were present in the environment?  
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A similar study with 19-month-olds, offers conflicting results.  When own and 
other-language speakers (both present in the room with the child) demonstrated two 
different unusual actions on the same object, participants imitated both speakers equally 
(Howard et al., 2011).  Howard and colleagues (in prep) also found that 18-month-olds 
imitated own- and other-language speakers equally often when each participant only saw 
one speaker in a between-subjects design (as cited in Howard et al., 2011).  Thus, when 
speakers were live in the room, children learned from both in-group and out-group 
members. 
 
The Present Study  
The research reported here examined how a particular social-category dimension 
— foreign language — would affect preschool children’s behavior on three outcomes: a) 
learning the function of an object (less-conventional information); b) learning an object 
label (highly-conventional information); and c) exhibiting a preference for one of the 
speakers.  The present research involved two factors that previously had not been directly 
considered in the same study: whether children rely on the social dimension of language 
and accent to form in-group preferences and learning biases when the speaker is the sole 
source of information (versus when forced to choose), and when the speaker is present in 
the room (versus on video).  In some tasks, participants were forced to choose between 
two information sources, whereas on other tasks, they were free to accept or reject an 
individual speaker’s information.  I varied between subjects whether speakers were 
present in the room or appeared on video, which allowed me to determine whether a 
speaker’s physical presence affected preferences and learning.  Finally, I counterbalanced 
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whether children were asked a set of preference questions first, or after a set of learning 
questions, to determine if the length of exposure to a foreign speaker (including playing 
with the same toys as she did) would affect preferences and learning. 
There were several possible outcomes of the learning tasks.  If children’s 
“default” response is to learn from a person (regardless of social-category) who is not 
contradicted by another individual, they should learn equally well from a native and from 
a foreign speaker on both the object function and object label task.  If children rely on the 
social dimension of foreign-vs-native language to guide learning of highly-conventional 
information only, they should learn an object label from a native (but not a foreign) 
speaker, whereas they should learn an object function from both speakers equally.  
Finally, if children rely on a speaker’s language to guide learning of any potentially-
conventional information, children should learn both object label and object function 
from a native (but not foreign) speaker.  
In regard to the effect of medium (live or video), it is possible that seeing a 
foreign speaker on video adds a complicating layer to young children’s recognition that 
this person is a viable social partner from whom to learn.  If this is the case, children who 
saw a foreign speaker on video should not learn as well (either object function or object 
label information) as children who saw a foreign speaker live.  It was also possible, that 
only young preschoolers would exhibit this residual “video deficit”.  
If children rely on a speaker’s language to form in-group preferences (especially 
if this is a species-wide tendency wrought by evolution), they should prefer the native 
speaker to the foreign speaker regardless of medium or task order.  However, it was 
possible that medium would affect preferences.  On the one hand, seeing a foreign 
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speaker live in the environment may make children more comfortable with her; they may 
feel more engaged with her than if she appeared on a video.  If so; children who see the 
speakers live should show less of an in-group preference than children who see the 
speakers on video.  On the other hand, seeing a foreign speaker in person may make her 
out-group trait more salient.  Her difference from other people the child meets in daily 
life may appear more pronounced, compared to seeing a foreign speaker on video; if so, 
children who see the speakers live may show a stronger in-group preference than those 
who see the speakers on video.  
Task order could also affect learning and preferences.  Children who demonstrate 
in-group favoritism when asked preference questions first might have been “primed” to 
focus on language differences and used that to guide from whom they would learn.  In 
contrast, children who spend time with a foreign speaker during learning tasks, watching 
her play with toys that the children then get to share, could feel more connected to the 
foreign speaker, like her more, and show less systematic in-group preferences than 
children who were asked the preference questions at the start.   
 The present study includes both 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds for several reasons. 
First, previous social learning studies demonstrate that children’s ability to discern the 
trustworthiness of a speaker increases over this age range (e.g., Koenig & Harris, 2005). 
Second, previous research suggests 3-year-olds may learn better from someone in their 
environment than on video, thus I wanted to see if a video “deficit” might contribute to 
children’s difficulty learning from foreign speakers. Finally, including both ages allowed 
me to see if my results would replicate previous research in which preferences for native 
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speakers were found for similar age groups (2.5 year olds in Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke 
2012; 5-year-olds in Kinzler et al., 2007).    
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CHAPTER V 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
A total of 64 three- and five-year old monolingual English-speaking children 
participated: 32 three-year-olds (M = 37.0 months, SD = 4.39; 16 girls) and 32 five-year-
olds (M = 60.1 months, SD = 3.33; 17 girls).  Participants were recruited via telephone 
from state birth records.  To ensure a monolingual sample with little to no exposure to 
foreign languages, parents were asked if their child had any significant exposure to 
languages besides English.  Children were excluded from participating if they were 
exposed to a language besides English for more than 5% of time in a given week or if 
their foreign-language exposure came from a close family member (e.g., a grandparent 
living in another country).  Additional children were tested but excluded from the final 
analysis for parental interference (n = 2), and suspected developmental delay (n = 1). 
 
Study Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subject conditions to 
examine whether or not spending time with the foreign speaker and playing with the 
same toys (either seeing the real person or watching a video of her) before completing the 
preference tasks affected children’s preferences and learning.  In the Live/Learning first 
condition, an English speaker and Russian speaker were present in the room and 
participants completed a set of learning tasks prior to a set of preference tasks.  The 
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Video/Learning first condition was the same but the speakers were on pre-recorded video.  
In the Live/Preference first and Video/Preference first conditions, the speakers were, 
respectively in the room or on video, and preference tasks were completed first. To 
examine the effect of question type on children’s preferences for and learning from native 
versus foreign speakers, all participants were given both forced-choice measures in which 
they chose between the English and Russian speaker (“Forced-Choice” tasks) and 
measures in which they saw one speaker at a time and could accept or reject her 
information (“One-Speaker” tasks).   
There were eight 3-year-olds and eight 5-year-olds in each condition.  Analyses 
indicated no significant differences in participants’ ages per condition, F(3,60) =.028, p = 
.994. 
 
Personnel 
Native and Foreign-Language Speakers. Three English-speaking and two 
Russian-speaking research assistants acted as the native and the foreign-language speaker 
throughout the course of the study.  The two Russian speakers were bilingual (with 
English) from birth.  Through pilot tests using photos, I ensured that preschoolers had no 
a priori preferences for any of the speakers based on appearance alone.  Each participant 
saw one English and one Russian speaker; which pair the participant saw was dependent 
upon scheduling (see Figure 1 for speaker pairings).  Analyses confirmed that there were 
no differences in children’s behavior between speaker pairs.1  
                                                          
1
 Speaker pair 1 was used for 20.3% of participants; pair 2 for 31.2% and pair 3 for 48.4%. I combined 
results for Speaker pairs 1 and 2 (foreign-speaker Jaquelene) to compare to pair 3 (foreign-speaker Eliz), 
and chi-square analyses indicated no differences between speakers on children’s learning or preference 
tasks. 
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Pair 1: English Speaker Lauren & Russian Speaker Jaquelene 
 
Pair 2: English Speaker Libby and Russian Speaker Jaquelene 
 
Pair 3: English Speaker Zoë and Russian Speaker Eliz 
Figure 1. Speaker pairs used during the study. 
 
To help participants differentiate between the English and Russian speakers, each 
wore a different brightly colored shirt (blue or yellow) with shirt color counterbalanced.  
To match the Live and Video conditions, participants viewed the same pair of speakers 
for a given counterbalanced order.  For example, if a participant in the Live/Preference 
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First/Order 3 saw Speaker Pair 1, a participant in the Video/Preference First/Order 3 saw 
a pre-recorded video of Speaker Pair 1.  
Researcher. An English-speaking researcher interacted with the child during 
warm up (e.g., played puzzles) and administered all tasks to the child. 
 
Materials 
 Videos, Speaker photos, and Language-demonstration toys. A total of 24 
videos were created, 8 videos per speaker pair, which matched the 8 Live condition 
counterbalancing orders (e.g., which person spoke first, what shirt color she wore, etc.).  
Videos were displayed on a 32” (81cm) television set, and were paused (on a blank 
screen) when it was the child’s turn to complete a task.  Additionally, 4x6 photos of each 
speaker were used as prompts in several of the tasks.  A set of three plastic animals 
(horse, turtle, and sheep) and a plastic bucket were used during the speakers’ language 
demonstration. 
 
Learning Tasks. 
“One-Speaker” Imitation. Materials for the imitation task were based on those 
from McGuigan et al., 2007.  I used two dual-compartment boxes (see Figure 2), with 
one compartment of each baited with a sticker.  Each box also had two entry points 
(corresponding to the two compartments) with two distinct closure systems: the blue box 
had a yellow bolt to push out and a purple screen to push aside; the purple box had a red-
and-white door to open and a brown leather flap to lift.  Opening one of the two closures 
was irrelevant to retrieving the sticker.  Thus, when the researcher opened both closures 
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before retrieving the sticker, she produced an irrelevant action that allowed us to measure 
“over-imitation” by the participant.  The box that each speaker used was counterbalanced 
across participants, but the location of the sticker in the box remained the same (the 
stickers were placed behind the purple screen and the leather flap). 
 
 
Figure 2. Dual-compartment boxes used in the “One-Speaker” Imitation tasks. 
 
Forced-Choice Imitation. I used two novel objects, a hose connector and a 
wooden rolling toy, each of which could be acted upon in two ways by the two speakers 
(Figure 3).  Order of object presentation, as well as the speakers’ actions on the object, 
were counterbalanced across participants. 
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Figure 3. Novel objects and actions used in the Forced-Choice Imitation task. 
 
“One-Speaker” Word Learning. Three familiar items used for training included a 
rubber duck, a green toy car, and a small plastic spoon.  Novel items were unfamiliar 
plastic objects that the child could not spontaneously name: a green pencil sharpener 
paired with an orange hook, and a green circular object paired with a red rubber object 
(Figure 4).  The pair used by each speaker, as well as which object was the target within 
each pair, was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
 
Figure 4. Novel object pairs used in the “One-Speaker” Word Learning task. 
 
Toy Action A: rolling the toy on 
the table 
Toy Action B: picking the toy up 
and spinning the wheels with 
one’s hand 
 
Hose Action A: holding up to 
one’s mouth like a horn 
Hose Action B: holding up to 
one’s eye like a telescope 
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Forced-Choice Word Learning. A single novel black wooden object (Figure 5) 
was given a different novel label by each of the speakers, which label each speaker used 
was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
 
Figure 5. Novel object used in the Forced-Choice Word Learning task. 
 
 Preference Tasks. 
Forced-Choice Toy Giving. A yellow and a blue plastic bucket (corresponding to 
speakers’ shirt colors) as well as two multi-colored plastic balls were used for the toy-
giving task (Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 6. Items and photographs used in the Forced-Choice Toy Giving task. 
 
“One-Speaker” Toy Endorsement. Four colorful, multi-part wooden toys were 
used for the toy endorsement task.  I paired two toys that had similar twisting actions: a 
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wooden block with holes and plastic screws, and a set of wooden nuts and bolts of 
different colors and sizes.  The second pair of toys required similar stacking actions: a set 
of colorful pegs with corresponding stackable rings and a colorful wooden building set.  
All toys were stored in clear plastic containers with a photo of the assembled toy on the 
top.  Matched toys (Figures 7 and 8) offered similar action affordances to avoid 
preferences for toy type (i.e., some children may simply prefer stacking toys to twisting 
toys).  The pair of toys each speaker used and which toy was the target were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 
 
Figure 7. Twisting toys used in the “One-Speaker” Toy Endorsement task. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Stacking toys used in the “One-Speaker” Toy Endorsement task. 
 
Forced-Choice Tool Choice. A yellow wooden box with a silver “fish” handle 
(see Figure 9) could be opened using one of two novel tools created out of foam board 
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and duct tape.  One was orange with red stripes and a black handle; the other was red 
with white dots and a black handle.  I counterbalanced the tool that each speaker used. 
 
 
Figure 9. Tools and yellow box used in the Forced-Choice Tool Choice task. 
 
 Forced-Choice Extra Viewing.  Photos of the speakers were used for children to 
choose whom to bring back for another demonstration.  The chosen speaker brought in a 
novel “toy”: a red box with an affixed doorbell that children could ring.  
“One- Speaker” Extension Task. Children were shown a PowerPoint 
presentation in which each slide contained one photo of a preschool-aged boy or girl (see 
Figure 10) accompanied by an audio clip of a child speaking either English or Russian.  
Each audio clip consisted of a female or male English-speaking or Russian-speaking 
child reading portions of unfamiliar children’s poems.  
 
 
Figure 10. Photos of “unknown” children used in the “One-speaker” Extension task. 
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 Forced-Choice Extension Task. Three additional PowerPoint slides contained 
pairs of speakers matched on gender and age.  Audio clips of Russian- and English-
speaking children were the same as in the “One Speaker” Extension task; audio clips of 
adults were recordings of English- and Russian-speaking research assistants making a 
neutral statement (“There are four seasons. Winter, spring, summer, fall”).  The adult 
audio clips were never of the same speaker who appeared in the actual experiment (e.g., 
if Speaker Pair 1 were in the experiment, the audio clips of speaker pair 3 were used in 
the Extension task).  Factors counterbalanced across children included: the photo paired 
with the English speaking audio clip, which side of the screen the “English speaker” was 
on, and order of speaker-pair presentation.  See Figures 11, 12 and 13 for speaker 
pairings. 
 
 
Figure 11. Speaker pair 1 in the Forced-Choice Extension task. 
 
Figure 12. Speaker pair 2 in the Forced-Choice Extension task. 
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Figure 13. Speaker pair 3 in the Forced-Choice Extension task. 
 
Procedure 
Participants colored with crayons or played with puzzles while their parents 
completed the consent forms.  Participants then were seated at a small table across from 
the speakers’ chairs (in Live conditions) or a video monitor (in Video conditions).  
Holding up a photo of each speaker in turn, the researcher said the speaker’s name and 
the language she spoke (e.g., “This is Eliz.  She speaks Russian”).  Next, the researcher 
told participants that each speaker would show them some things and then they would get 
a turn to play.  The researcher obtained the participant’s assent and then said, “Let’s meet 
the girls.”  The speakers entered the room or the video was turned on. 
Language Introduction.  All participants first saw the English and Russian 
speaker playing with and labeling familiar toys in order to establish the language she 
spoke.  The speakers entered the room (live or on video) sat down next to each other 
facing the participant, and introduced themselves, saying, “Hi, my name is ______” (the 
Russian speaker said the equivalent in Russian.)  The first speaker then played with three 
familiar toys and made comments about her actions with the toys (“Look, a horse! The 
horse gallops across the table!”  “Look, a turtle! The turtle is hopping up my arm!” 
“Look, a sheep! The sheep jumps into the bucket!”).  While the first speaker played with 
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the toys, the other speaker neutrally watched the toys, not making eye contact with the 
child or the first speaker.  The second speaker then played with the same toys in the same 
way, making the equivalent statements in her language.  The speaker on the child’s left 
always spoke first; this was counterbalanced to ensure that half the participants heard the 
English speaker talk first and half heard the Russian speaker talk first. 
Participants in the Learning First conditions next moved on to the learning tasks 
followed by the preference tasks; participants in the Preference First conditions 
completed the task sets in the opposite order. 
 
Learning Tasks. 
The learning tasks consisted of forced-choice and one-speaker imitation and 
word-learning tasks.  I thought of imitation of an action on an object as less conventional 
than the meaning of a word, and the question was whether children would be more 
willing to imitate a foreign speaker than to learn a word from her. 
“One-Speaker” Imitation.  One speaker remained seated at the table with one of 
the dual-compartment boxes in front of her (in person or on the video).  The other 
speaker left the room.  The researcher said, “Watch closely and then you will have a 
turn”.  The speaker said “[hello]” (in her own language to remind the child of the 
language she spoke) and then silently demonstrated a two-step process (with the first-step 
being irrelevant) to retrieve a sticker.  She repeated the demonstration and then said 
“[goodbye]” and left the room.  The researcher then handed the box to the child and said, 
“There is one sticker in this box and it is your turn to get the sticker.”  Participants were 
given 30 seconds to retrieve it.  If they did not succeed, the researcher said, “We will get 
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it later” and waited until after the second box demonstration to give the child the stickers.  
The other speaker then entered the room and the same procedure was repeated with the 
other box.  Order of speakers and which box (blue or purple) each speaker used was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Forced-Choice Imitation. Both speakers then returned to the room.  One of the 
two novel objects (hose connector or wooden rolling toy) was placed in the center of the 
table.  Each speaker demonstrated a different way to use the object.  The first speaker 
said “[I do this]” and demonstrated her action, set the toy down, picked it back up and 
repeated her statement and action; the second speaker said the equivalent in her language 
before demonstrating her action, also repeating the process twice.  For the hose 
connector, one speaker would blow into it like a horn whereas the other would look into 
it like a telescope.  For the wooden toy, one speaker would roll it along the table whereas 
the other would pick it up and move the wheels with the palm of her hand.  After the 
speakers departed, the researcher handed the object to the participant and said, “Show me 
what you do with this.”  The participant was given 30 seconds to play with the object.  
Next the speakers came back into the room and the same procedure was repeated with the 
other novel object.  Again the speakers departed and the child had 30 seconds to play 
with the object.  Order of object presentation and which action each speaker 
demonstrated were counterbalanced across participants.  
“One-Speaker” Word Learning.  Next, the Russian or English speaker entered 
the room, said “[hello]” and sat down.  She first labeled two familiar items to 
demonstrate the object labeling procedure and to remind children of the language she 
spoke.  She pointed at a rubber duck, labeled it, “Ooo [duck]!” (in her own language), 
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picked it up, labeled it again, “[duck]!” and then placed it in a small bucket.  The speaker 
then removed the toy from the bucket and passed the toy and bucket to the participant. 
The researcher said, “Now it is your turn to put it in the bucket.”  The process was 
repeated with another familiar object (a toy car).  Next, a set of two novel objects were 
placed on the table.  The speaker pointed and looked at the target and labeled it, using 
one of two novel labels: dax or fep.  So for example she said, “Ooo dax!” picked it up 
and repeated the novel label “dax!”  She then pointed and looked at the distracter object 
and labeled it, “Ooo [this one]” (in her own language), picked it up and repeated “[this 
one]!”, placed the two objects in the bucket, and then removed them and gave them to the 
child to put into the bucket.  To provide a slight delay before the test trial, she labeled one 
more familiar item (a spoon).  Participants were first asked about a pair of the familiar 
items to acclimate them to the testing process.  The speaker held out two of the familiar 
items and then said the name of a desired object twice in a questioning voice (e.g., 
“[spoon]?” “[spoon]?”)  If children did not choose an object, the researcher said in 
English “Can you pick the [spoon] and put it in the bucket?”  Next, the speaker held out 
the two novel items (presented on the opposite side than it was during labeling) and the 
speaker said, for instance, “dax?” dax?”  If the child did not choose, the researcher said, 
“Can you pick the dax and put it in the bucket?”  Next, the first speaker departed and the 
second speaker entered the room and repeated the same process.  The familiar objects 
were the same.  For the set of novel objects, she labeled the target using the novel word 
that the first speaker did not use (e.g., “fep”).  She labeled the distracter “[this one]”.  The 
set of novel objects each speaker used, which object within the set was the target, 
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whether she labeled the target first or second, and speaker order (English or Russian first) 
was counterbalanced. 
Forced-Choice Word learning.  Both speakers then entered the room and sat 
down.  There was one novel object (the black wooden toy) on the table.  The first speaker 
pointed to it and labeled it with one of two novel labels: “verma” or “jukta” (Russian 
words that could be said with a Russian or English accent).  For example she said, 
“verma!” and then picked it up and said “verma!” and put it back in the center of the 
table.  The second speaker then pointed to the same object and said, “jukta!”, picked it up 
and said “jukta!” and then put it back in the center of the table.  Both speakers then left 
the room.  The researcher pointed to the object and asked, “What is this called?”  If 
children did not respond, the researcher repeated the labels using the speaker photos as 
prompts (“She said ‘verma’….she said ‘jukta’….what do you think this is called, ‘verma’ 
or ‘jukta’?”)  Speaker order and which label each speaker used were counterbalanced 
across participants. 
 
Preference Tasks. 
Most of the previous research on social category biases has used forced-choice 
preference tasks.  I examined whether children would endorse the foreign speaker more if 
this choice was not pitted against endorsing the native speaker.  I also included 
preference tasks to see if children’s preference choices might be linked to selective 
learning biases. 
 Forced-Choice Toy Giving.  While both speakers were out of the room, two 
buckets were placed on the table (corresponding to each speaker’s shirt color and side of 
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the table) with the speakers’ photos each in front of the color-corresponding bucket.  The 
researcher gave the participant two balls, one of which they could keep and one to give 
away.  Once the participant chose which ball to give away, the researcher asked, “Who 
do you want to give the ball to?  You can put it in her bucket and we will give it to her 
later.”  After the participant dropped the ball in (or pointed to) a bucket, the researcher 
said, “Thanks, we will give it to her later” and put all the materials away.  
 “One-Speaker” Toy Endorsement.  Next, one speaker entered the room and said 
“[hello]”. She brought either the “Twisting” pair of toys or the “Stacking” pair of toys.  
The researcher said, “Watch closely and then you will have a turn to choose.”  The 
speaker then opened one box, played with the toy for 20 seconds, and then opened the 
other box and played with the toy for an equal amount of time.  Next, she looked back 
and forth between the toys, said “[hmmm – I want this one]” and pointed to and then 
played with her chosen toy for approximately 60 seconds.  She then put both toys back 
into their boxes and left the room.  The researcher showed participants the pair of toys 
and asked them which one they wanted to play with (participants could only choose one).  
Participants were allowed to play with the toy for approximately 3-4 minutes.  The 
process was then repeated with the second speaker, who played with (and chose one 
from) the other pair of toys.  Speaker order, the toy set each speaker used, and the chosen 
toy within each set were counterbalanced across participants. 
Forced-Choice Tool Endorsement.  Both speakers then entered the room and sat 
down.  A yellow wooden box and two novel tools (red and orange) were placed on the 
table.  The first speaker said “[I use this one]”, picked up a tool and opened the box with 
it, repeating the process twice.  Next, the second speaker did the same with the other tool.  
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Both speakers left the room.  The researcher put each speaker’s photo next to the tool she 
used and then asked the participant, “which tool do you want to use to open the box?” 
(participants could only choose one).  The participant was then given 30 seconds to play 
with the tool and box.  Speaker order and which tool each speaker used were 
counterbalanced across participants. 
Forced-Choice Extra Viewing.  Next, while both speakers were out of the room, 
the researcher held up their photos and said to the child, “One of the girls can show you 
one more toy.  Who do you want to come back in [whose video do you want to watch] to 
show you another toy?”  Once the child chose a speaker, that speaker returned to the 
room (or her pre-recorded video clip was shown) and demonstrated how to use a new toy 
(a doorbell attached to a box). After she left the room, the child was given a turn to play 
with the toy. 
“One-speaker” Extension.  The participant was then shown a set of photos of 
children who spoke either English or Russian and asked to rate how much he or she 
would like to play with that child.  To do so, the participant pointed to a cardboard 
“ratings scale” on which three schematic faces were drawn: one smiling (which the 
researcher verbally labeled “a lot”); one neutral (labeled “a little”); and one frowning 
(labeled “not at all”).  The researcher then showed each photo one at a time saying, 
“he/she speaks English/Russian, listen” and played the corresponding audio clip.  After 
each audio clip the researcher asked, “How much would you like to play with him/her?” 
and waited for the participant to point at one of the faces on the chart (smiling, neutral or 
frowning) before moving on to the next photo.  Photo order, and whether each photo was 
linked to an English or Russian audio clip was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Forced-Choice Extension.  The researcher then showed the participant three sets 
of side-by-side photos: one pair of preschool-age girls, one pair of preschool-age boys, 
and one pair of adult females.  The researcher showed each pair one at a time and pointed 
to one photo in the pair and said “this girl/boy/teacher speaks English – listen”, played a 
corresponding audio clip and then pointed to the other photo and said “and this 
girl/boy/teacher speaks Russian – listen”.  The researcher asked the participant, “If you 
could only pick one of these girls/boys/teachers to play with, who would you choose?”  
After the participant chose one of the photos, the researcher repeated the process with the 
next pair.  Which speaker within the pair spoke English, and on which side of the screen 
he or she appeared was counterbalanced.  Also, whether children first completed the 
“One Speaker” Extension task or the “Two Speakers” Extension task was 
counterbalanced.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 The primary questions were whether children would learn from a Russian speaker 
when she was in the room versus on video, as well as whether children’s learning across 
two domains (object function and word learning) differed if the Russian speaker 
presented her information independently or if her information conflicted with that 
presented by the English speaker.  
A secondary question was whether a speaker’s presence in the room versus on 
video would affect how much children “liked” her, which was assessed using a series of 
preference tasks: one in which children could endorse or reject a single speaker’s 
preferred toy, as well as three tasks in which children had to choose between the two 
speakers.  Two additional independent factors were considered: task order (whether 
participants were given the learning tasks or the preference tasks first) and participant age 
(split into 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds).  Preliminary analyses were conducted to see if 
these factors had any effects on each dependent measure. If so, separate results are 
presented. 
 
Attention 
 As a measure of attentiveness, I assessed the proportion of time children spent 
looking at the English and the Russian speakers’ demonstrations during “One-Speaker” 
tasks and at both speakers during “Forced-Choice” tasks.  An additional coder recorded 
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children’s attentiveness for 20% of the videotaped sessions.  Inter-rater reliability was 
high (ρI = .96, p < .001).  Two participants were excluded from attention analyses 
because of technical problems with their videotapes. 
I conducted Kruskal-Wallis
2
 tests to examine differences in attentiveness by 
condition (split by age group) on three dependent variables: a) proportion of time spent 
looking at English speaker demonstrations b) proportion of time spent looking at Russian 
speaker demonstrations and c) proportion of time spent looking at demonstrations with 
both speakers present (see Table 1 for means).  Results of the Kruskal-Wallis indicated a 
significant difference between conditions in attentiveness to the English speaker 
demonstrations (χ2(3, N = 62) = 13.359, p <.005) and to the Russian speaker 
demonstrations (χ2(3, N = 62) = 15.775, p <.005).  Follow-up Mann-Whitney U tests3, 
indicated 3-year-olds in the Video condition were less attentive to the Russian speaker 
than 3-year-olds/Live (U = 44.5, z = -3.196, p < .005, r = -0.4), 5-year-olds/Live (U = 
35.5, z = -3.240, p < .005, r = -.41) or 5-year-olds/Video (U = 57.5, z = -2.672, p = .007, r 
=-.34). Additionally 3-year-olds in the Video condition were less attentive to the English 
speaker than 3-year-olds/Live (U = 49.0, z = -3.14, p < .005, r =-.4) or 5-year-olds/Live 
(U = 52.0, z = -2.602, p = .012, r = -.33).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and Mann-Whitney U tests were used because the attentiveness data 
violated the assumption of normality of data, which is necessary for ANOVA. 
3
 I used a Bonferonni adjusted alpha of .017 (.05/3 tests) as my criteria for determining significance in the 
Mann-Whitney U tests.  
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Table 1 
Mean proportion of time spent watching the demonstration by condition and age group 
Age Group Condition English Russian Both 
3-year-olds 
Live .987 (.036) .980 (.044) .961 (.070) 
Video .944 (.065) .897 (.110) .976 (.051) 
5 year olds 
Live .985 (.031) .989 (.019) .997 (.008) 
Video .977 (.050) .982 (.020) .989 (.013) 
 
 
Overall attention was very high and no participants were dropped for lack of 
attentiveness to the demonstrations.  Additionally, logistic regressions indicated that 
differences in attentiveness were not related to learning.  Attentiveness to the Russian 
speaker demonstrations did not predict over-imitation, using either coding criterion (b = 
1.66, z = 1.602, p =.102; b = .25, z = .265, p = .791) nor word learning (b = 0.41, z = .442, 
p = .659).  Similarly attentiveness to the English speaker did not predict either set of 
over-imitation scores (b = .45, z = .334. p = .738; b = .49, z = .362, p = .717) nor word 
learning (b = -1.33625, z = -.865, p = .387). 
 
Learning Tasks 
“One-Speaker” Imitation.  In this task, the speaker used 3 steps to retrieve a 
sticker: (1) an irrelevant step (e.g., removing the yellow dowel); (2) a necessary step (e.g., 
opening the purple doors); and (3) the final step of retrieving the sticker.  I coded over-
imitation in two ways.  Based on a liberal coding criterion, children were credited with 
over-imitating if they completed steps 1 and 2 (regardless of order) prior to step 3.  I 
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reasoned that if children first completed step 2 but remembered to go back and complete 
step 1 before retrieving the sticker, they were still reproducing the irrelevant action prior 
to achieving their goal.  However, I also wanted to examine how many children 
reproduced the speaker’s exact behavioral sequence using the strict coding criterion of 
completing all of the speaker’s steps in the demonstrated order.  A second coder assessed 
50% of the videotapes for reliability, which was very good for over-imitation of both the 
Russian speaker and the English speaker (both κs = .93, ps < .001). 
First I present the results using the liberal coding criterion. Preliminary analyses 
revealed no significant differences in over-imitation by age group or task order. 
In binomial tests, the numbers of children who over-imitated the Russian speaker 
(45 of 64) and the English speaker (44 of 64) were both significantly above chance (ps < 
.005).  Chi-square tests of independence indicated that the number of children who over-
imitated the Russian speaker was the same whether she was present (22 of 32) or on 
video (23 of 32), χ2 (1, N = 64) = 0.075, p = .784.  The same was true for the English 
speaker (Live (22 of 32); Video (22 of 32), χ2 (1, N = 64) = 0.00, p = 1.0).  Therefore, 
when an “in-group” speaker or an “out-group” speaker was the sole source of 
information, children learned a new behavior from her and imitated it exactly, and they 
were equally likely to do so whether she was actually present or on video.   
Using the stricter coding criterion (all steps in order as demonstrated) revealed a 
difference in the younger children’s over-imitation.  A chi-square test of independence 
indicated a significant difference in children’s exact over-imitation of the Russian 
speaker by condition (split by age group): χ2 (3, N = 64) = 9.069, p = .028, Cramer’s V = 
.376.  Three-year-olds in the Video condition were the least likely to exactly over-imitate 
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(5 of 16) compared to 3-year-olds in the Live condition (11 of 16), 5-year-olds in the 
Video condition (13 of 16) and 5-year-olds in the Live condition (9 of 16).  There was no 
difference between conditions (split by age group) on exact over-imitation of the English 
speaker χ2 (3, N = 64) = 1.914, p = .591; 3-year-olds/Video: 9 of 16, 3-year-olds/Live: 10 
of 16, 5-year-olds/Video:12 of 16, 5-year-olds/Live: 12 of 16.  There also were no effects 
of task order (whether participants were given learning or preference tasks first) on exact 
over-imitation of the Russian speaker (χ2 (1, N = 64) = 0.00, p = 1.0) or English speaker 
(.χ2(1, N = 64) = 1.772, p = .183)  Overall, the stricter analysis indicates that younger 
children were more likely to reproduce the Russian speaker’s exact behavioral sequence 
when she was in the room than when she was on video.  
“Forced-Choice” Imitation.  In these tasks, children needed to choose whether 
to copy the behavior of the English speaker or the Russian speaker.  A second coder 
assessed 50% of the videos for reliability, which was good (κ = .75, p < .001); I went 
back and reviewed any discrepancies.  Preliminary analyses indicated no difference in 
children’s forced-choice imitation behaviors by age or task order.  Children showed a 
significant preference for one of the novel actions on the wooden toy: 47 children 
endorsed the table rolling action and 13 the hand rolling action, whether demonstrated by 
the English or Russian speaker, χ2 (2, N = 64) = 48.219 p < .005; therefore I did not 
conduct further analyses of data with this stimulus.  (This toy was used in a previous 
study, but the demonstrated hand rolling action was not contradicted by another speaker’s 
action.) 
For the hose stimulus, children were equally divided between endorsing the 
English speaker’s action, the Russian speaker’s action or neither (chi-square for 
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goodness-of-fit, χ2 (2, N = 64) = 0.125, p = .939).  A chi-square test of independence 
indicated that the patterns of speaker endorsement did not differ whether speakers were in 
the room or on video, χ2(1, N = 64) = 1.164, p = .559 (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
The number of children who endorsed each speaker’s novel action in the Forced-Choice 
Imitation task 
 
Condition English Russian Neither 
Live 12 8 12 
Video 10 12 10 
 
 
Therefore, children were equally likely to endorse the novel action of an English speaker 
or a Russian speaker, and patterns of endorsement did not differ whether speakers were 
present or on video. Overall, children did not systematically choose to imitate the “in-
group” speaker. 
“One-Speaker” Word Learning.  Children were coded as learning the novel 
word if they correctly chose the novel object labeled by the speaker rather than the other 
object.  A second coder assessed 50% of the videos for reliability which was very good 
for the Russian (κ = .93, p < .001) and English (κ = .94, p < .001) speakers.  Preliminary 
analyses revealed significant differences in word learning from both speakers based on 
age group (learning from the Russian speaker: χ2(1, N = 63) = 4.661, p = .031, Cramer’s 
V = .272; learning from the English speaker: χ2(1, N = 63) = 4.870, p = .027, Cramer’s V 
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= .278)  so results are presented separately.  There were no significant differences by task 
order. 
In binomial tests, the number of 5-year-olds who learned a novel word from the 
Russian speaker (19 of 32) was not significantly different from chance (p = .377), nor 
was the number (10 of 31) of 3-year-olds (p = .071).  Chi-square tests of independence 
indicated that learning rates for 5-year-olds did not differ whether the Russian speaker 
was present (8 of 16) or on video (11 of 16), χ2(1, N = 32) = 1.166, p = .280; the same 
was true for 3-year-olds (Live, 5 of 15; Video 5 of 16), χ2 (1, N = 31) = .015, p = .91.  
Therefore, neither 5-year-olds nor 3-year-olds learned a novel word from a Russian 
speaker, even when she was the sole source of information and was present in the room. 
There is the possibility that children could not understand the word-learning task 
when presented by a Russian speaker, but would do better if the English speaker taught 
them a word first, then the Russian speaker.  However, there was no effect of speaker 
order on word learning from the Russian speaker, χ2 (1, N = 63) = .412, p = .521 
In binomial tests, the number of 5-year-olds who learned a novel word from the 
English speaker (25 of 32) was significantly greater than chance (p < .005).  In contrast, 
the number of 3-year-olds who learned the word from the English speaker (16 of 31) was 
not. A chi-square test of independence indicated that learning rates for 5-year-olds did not 
differ whether the speaker was present (13 of 16) or on video (12 of 16), χ2 (1, N = 32) = 
0.183, p = .669; the same was the case for 3-year-olds (Live, 9 of 15; Video, 7 of 16), χ2 
(1, N = 31) = 0.819, p =.366.  
Therefore, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, learned a novel word from an English 
speaker when she was the sole source of information, whether she was present in the 
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room or on video.  The difficulty of the word-learning task and a simpler task that might 
be used in future research are discussed in the next chapter. 
“Forced-Choice” Word Learning. In this task, children could either endorse the 
English speaker’s novel label, the Russian speaker’s novel label or neither.  A second 
coder assessed 50% of the videos and reliability was very good (κ = .89). 
A chi-square test for goodness-of-fit indicated that the number of 5-year-olds who 
endorsed the English speaker’s label (26) was significantly greater than the number who 
endorsed the Russian speaker’s label (0) or neither label (6), χ2 (1, N = 32) = 12.5 , p < 
.005, whereas the number of  3-year-olds who endorsed neither speaker’s label (18) was 
significantly greater than the number who endorsed the English speaker’s label (10) or 
the Russian speaker’s label (4), χ2 (2, N = 32) = 9.25 , p  =.01. 
A chi-square test of independence indicated that 5-year-olds were more likely to 
endorse the English speaker’s label when speakers were on video than when they were 
present, χ2 (1, N = 32) = 7.385, p = .007, Cramer’s V = .480, whereas 3-year-olds’ 
patterns of label endorsement did not differ by condition, χ 2(2, N = 32) = .622, p= .733 
(see Table 3).  
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Table 3 
The number of children who endorsed each speaker’s novel label in the Forced-Choice 
Word Learning task 
 
Age Group Condition English Russian Neither 
5-year-olds 
Live 10 0 6 
Video 16 0 0 
3-year-olds 
Live  6 2 8 
Video 4 2 10 
  
 
Therefore, 5-year-olds, but not 3-year-olds, endorsed an English speaker’s label 
when it conflicted with the Russian speaker’s label.  However, 5-year-olds who saw both 
speakers in the room endorsed the English speaker’s label at lower rates than 5-year-olds 
who saw the speakers on video.  One interpretation of this result is that 5-year-olds were 
more willing to consider the Russian speaker’s label when she was present and were 
therefore more hesitant to endorse the English speaker’s label as the only correct option. 
Note that, if participants did not endorse a label after being asked the fir98st time, the 
researcher gave a verbal reminder of each speaker’s label. However, even with this 
additional memory prompt, over half of the 3-year-olds did not endorse a label. This may 
have been due to the task demand in which children had to verbally produce the answer 
rather than simply choosing an object.  
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Preference Tasks 
“One-Speaker” Preference Tasks. In this task children saw each speaker 
individually choose one of two toys and then children could choose between the same 
two toys.  I assessed the number of children that endorsed each speaker’s toy choice.  A 
second coder reviewed 50% of the videos and reliability was very good for the Russian 
speaker (κ = .81, p < .001) and the English speaker (κ = .88, p <.001).  Preliminary 
analyses indicated no significant differences in toy endorsement by age group or task 
order.  
In binomial tests, the number of children who chose to play with the same toy as 
the Russian speaker (36 of 64), and the English speaker (39 of 64) did not significantly 
differ from chance.  A chi-square test of independence indicated that children’s 
endorsement of the Russian speaker’s toy did not differ whether she was present (21 of 
32) or on video (15 of 32), χ2(1, N = 64) = 2.286, p = .131.  Endorsement of the English 
speaker was slightly higher when the speaker was present (23 of 32) than on Video (16 of 
32), χ2 (1, N = 32) = 3.216, p = .073, Cramer’s V = .224.  Overall, children did not 
systematically choose to play with the same toy as the one preferred by either speaker. 
Forced-Choice Preference Tasks.  Scores on the three forced-choice preference 
tasks were combined to calculate an overall preference score, comprising: a) to whom 
children chose to give a ball b) whose tool children endorsed, and c) who children chose 
to show them an additional toy.  A second coder assessed 50% of videos and reliability 
was very good for all three tasks: toy-giving (κ = .94, p <.001), tool-choice (κ = 1.0, p 
<.001) and extra-viewing (κ = .93, p <.001).  Children who chose the English speaker or 
the Russian speaker on at least two of the three forced-choice preference tasks were 
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coded as “Preferred English” or “Preferred Russian”.  Preliminary analyses indicated no 
age group differences between overall preference scores.  Comparisons of task order 
revealed a marginal difference that did not reach the conventional level of significance, 
χ2(1, N = 64) = 3.216, p = .073, Cramer’s V =.224; however, I present the results 
separately. 
 A chi-square test of independence indicated a significant difference in children’s 
overall preference scores by condition (split by task order), χ2(3, N = 64) = 8.599, p = 
.035, Cramer’s V = .367; children in the Live/Preference First condition were most likely 
to prefer the English speaker (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4 
The number of children who showed an overall preference for speaker by condition/task 
order 
 
Condition English  Russian 
Live/Preference First 14 2 
Live/Learning First 10 6 
Video/Preference  First 9 7 
Video/Learning First 6 10 
 
 
Therefore, children who saw the speakers Live in the room, and who were given 
the preference tasks first, were more likely to prefer the English speaker than the Russian 
speaker.  One interpretation of these results is that the Russian speaker’s “out-group” 
distinction was more salient to the children when she was present in the room (recall that 
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all participants had little to no exposure to foreign speakers).  However, children who 
spent time with her during the learning tasks warmed up to her and liked her more.  See 
Table 5 for a breakdown of children’s preferences on each of the three individual forced-
choice preference tasks, which contributed to the total preference score.  
 
Table 5 
The number of children who chose the English speaker versus the Russian speaker for the 
three Forced-Choice preference tasks 
 
 Toy Giving Tool Choice “Extra Viewing” 
Condition English Russian English Russian English Russian 
Live/Preference First 10 4 12 4 12 4 
Live/Learning First 9 7 8 8 11 5 
Video/Preference First 9 7 9 7 9 7 
Video/Learning First 7 9 8 8 7 9 
 
 
Chi-square tests of independence indicated no significant difference between conditions 
(split by task order) on the Toy Giving task (χ2 (3, N = 64) = 2.328, p = .507); the Tool 
Choice task (χ2 (3, N = 64) = 2.755, p = .431); or the Extra Viewing task (χ2 (3, N = 64) = 
3.873, p = .276).  Overall, participants in the Live/Preference First condition 
demonstrated the same pattern of performance (choosing the native speaker) on all three 
tasks. 
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Comparing Learning & Preferences  
 To see if children who preferred the Russian speaker were more likely to learn 
from her, I conducted a chi-square test of independence, which demonstrated that the 
children were equally likely to over-imitate the Russian speaker χ2 (1, N = 64) = .105, p = 
.746 and learn her novel word χ2 (1, N = 64) = .065, p = .799, whether they preferred her 
or the English speaker. Therefore, preferences did not appear to affect willingness to 
learn from the Russian speaker.  Similarly, learning from the Russian speaker did not 
affect preferences. Children who over-imitated the Russian speaker were not more likely 
to prefer her over the English speaker (χ2 (1, N = 64) = .105, p = .746) and children who 
learned a word from the Russian speaker were not more likely to prefer her over the 
English speaker (χ2(1, N = 64) = .065, p = .799). 
 
Extension Tasks  
Pilot testing indicated that the computerized preference extension tasks were 
difficult for 3-year-olds.  This may be due to the fact that the extension tasks were given 
at the end of the experimental session and 3-year-olds were tired or because they found it 
difficult to reason abstractly about friendship choices.  Therefore only 5-year-olds 
completed these tasks. In addition to condition (split by task order), I tested to see if 
children who preferred the Russian speaker they had seen in the study (e.g., were coded 
as “Preferred Russian” on the three forced-choice tasks) would be more likely than 
children who preferred the English speaker on those tasks to subsequently “like” 
unknown Russian speakers on the computerized extension task. 
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“One-speaker” Extension task.  Participants were shown a photograph and 
listened to an audio clip of unknown English and Russian-speaking children.  Participants 
rated how much they would like to play with each child (1 = “not at all”, 2 = “a little” 3 = 
“a lot”) and I calculated participants’ mean ratings of the English-speaking and Russian-
speaking children separately.  I conducted a 2 (condition: Live or Video) by 2 (study 
preference: English or Russian speaker) between-groups multivariate ANOVA on 
participants’ mean ratings of the unknown English and Russian speakers.  There were no 
significant differences in mean ratings of English speaking children or Russian speaking 
children by condition (F(2,27) = .664, p = .523, Wilks’ Lambda = .953, η p
 2 
 = .047) or 
participants’ previous preference for the Russian or English speaker from the study         
(F(2,27) = .797, p = .461, Wilks’ Lambda = .944, η p
 2 
 = .056; see Table 6 for mean 
ratings). 
 
Table 6 
Children’s mean ratings of the unknown English and Russian children in the 
computerized Extension task. 
 
Condition Study Preference English Russian 
Live 
Preferred English 2.27 (.696) 2.27 (.754) 
Preferred Russian 2.07 (.723) 2.00 (.791) 
Video 
Preferred English 2.38 (.518) 2.25 (.707) 
Preferred Russian 2.21 (.665) 1.81 (.799) 
Note. Ratings were on a 3-point scale indicating how much participants wanted to play 
with the child they saw in the photograph: 1 = “not at all”, 2 = “a little” 3 = “a lot”. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Forced-Choice Extension task.  In this task participants were shown three pairs 
of photographs (with accompanying audio clips) of an unknown English-speaker and 
Russian speaker, and had to choose with whom they would rather play.  I coded the 
number of children who preferred the English speaker on 2 of the 3 choices versus the 
number of children who preferred the Russian speaker on 2 of the 3 choices.  A chi-
square goodness-of-fit test indicated that the number of children who preferred the 
English speakers (25) significantly differed from the number who preferred the Russian 
speakers (6) or neither set of speakers (1), χ2 (2, N = 32) = 30.063, p <.005.  A chi-square 
test of independence indicated no significant difference on forced-choice extension task 
answers based on children’s previous preference for the Russian or English speaker from 
the study, χ2 (1, N = 31) = 2.451, p = .117 or condition (split by task order): χ2 (3, N = 31) 
= 1.026, p = .795. 
   Overall the results of the extension tasks suggest that if forced to choose, 5-year-
olds prefer to be friends with a native speaker; however if allowed to assess children 
individually, they like native and foreign speakers equally.  Additionally, preferences 
from the study did not affect preferences for unknown speakers.  One interpretation of 
this result is that getting to know and like one foreign speaker (live or on video) is not 
enough to ameliorate an in-group preference for unknown speakers (when forced to 
choose between native and foreign speakers).  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present study investigated whether preschool children are “cultural learners” 
selectively learning from social in-group versus out-group members. Using different 
methods than those used in previous research led to informative differences in the results. 
Preschool children learned about novel objects from both an in-group and out-group 
speaker when each speaker individually presented information. Children’s learning was 
not affected by whether speakers were present in the room or on video. Thus, it is 
unlikely that preschool children have a bias (innate or otherwise) to selectively learn from 
cultural in-group members versus out-group members.   
Specifically, the results of the present study suggest that 3- to 5-year-olds can 
learn non-linguistic information (a sequence of behaviors to achieve a goal) from a 
foreign speaker whether she is present in the room or on video. In this study the foreign 
speaker acted intentionally over a number of tasks, and provided social cues (such as eye 
contact and repetition) to indicate that she was offering relevant information. With this 
evidence that the speaker was intentionally conveying information, preschool children’s 
ingrained social learning skills may have overridden any hesitation they felt about 
learning from a cultural “out-group” member.   
My results contrast with those of Buttelmann and colleagues (2012) who used a 
between-subjects design in which participants only saw one speaker, and found that 14-
month-olds imitated unusual actions of a native speaker shown on video whereas those 
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who saw a foreign speaker on video did not. Differences in the participants’ age may be 
one reason for the contrasting results. Because my participants were older, they may have 
had more highly developed social learning skills compared to those of young toddlers 
(e.g., they may have been more likely to notice the intentional cues of a foreign 
demonstrator on video). Although in both studies children completed tasks in which they 
were given information from only one speaker, there is a procedural difference that may 
have led the participants in the present research to “warm up” more to the foreign 
speaker.  Between sole-information tasks, my native and foreign speaker were seen 
together (on the screen or in the room) neutrally sitting right next to each other; this may 
have led children to trust the foreign speaker more than they would have if she were seen 
by herself (and the only source of information) throughout the whole session.  In a 
follow-up study, I plan to use a between-subjects design in which participants will either 
see a native or foreign speaker alone. This will allow me to use one bilingual person as 
the speaker (as in Buttelmann et al., 2012) to ensure that the only difference between the 
speakers is the language spoken and to investigate whether preschoolers will learn from a 
foreign speaker when she is not seen with a native speaker. 
Using a strict over-imitation coding criterion, the results from the present study 
and Buttelmann et al.’s are more similar. Three-year-olds (my younger group) who saw 
the foreign speaker on video learned all three steps, but they did not reproduce her exact 
behavioral sequence (they immediately completed the effective action, and then went 
back and stuck in the irrelevant action before retrieving the sticker). Buttelmann et al.’s 
14-month-old participants learned how objects worked from a foreign speaker (e.g., that 
pushing a button would make a light turn on) but did not reproduce that person’s unusual 
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actions (e.g., pushing the button with their head) at the same rate as they did for a native 
speaker (they tended to complete the action in their own way rather than copying the 
modeler’s method). In the present study, 3-year-olds’ level of attentiveness to the Russian 
speaker in the Video condition was lower than in the other conditions, however, 
attentiveness overall was high and did not predict learning. In contrast, Buttelmann et al. 
did not find a difference in children’s attentiveness between those who saw videos of a 
native speaker and those who saw videos of a foreign speaker. These conflicting results 
demonstrate the need for more systematic research, using different age groups, 
presentation mediums and study design, to determine if and when young children 
demonstrate cultural learning biases. If learning biases are only present at certain ages or 
for certain tasks, it casts doubt on the argument that in-group biases are pervasive in 
guiding selective learning. In fact, if a bias to learn from cultural in-group members was 
present at age 14 months, one could argue it should only get stronger with age, as 
children gain more experience identifying and selectively learning from cultural in-group 
members. However, our results show development in the opposite direction: both 3- and 
5-year-olds were willing to learn both from a cultural out-group member and an in-group 
member. 
The current study enhances what we know about young children’s over-imitation. 
First, the results indicate that 3-year-olds who see a speaker’s face on video (and thus can 
discern her intentional “cues”) can over-imitate her actions; this finding confirms 
McGuigan and colleagues’ (2007) interpretation of 3-year-olds’ failure to over-imitate 
from video when they only saw a speaker’s hands (they reasoned that the children needed 
the intentional cues to realize that this was behavior that could be imitated). Additionally, 
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children in the present study over-imitated a foreign speaker.  This result aligns with 
Nielsen and Tomaselli’s (2010) finding that 2-to 13-year-old children from remote areas 
in the Kalahari Desert in Africa imitated the irrelevant actions of an English-speaking 
demonstrator who was there “in person”. Nielsen and colleagues (2008) have argued that 
young children imitate whatever a social partner does, even if it’s a seemingly irrelevant 
action, to affiliate with the demonstrator. In fact, he found that 4-to-5-year-olds imitated 
more irrelevant actions when the demonstrator was present during testing than on video 
(Nielsen & Blank, 2011). However, the results of the present study suggest that 3- to 5-
years, children’s over-imitation is more of an automatic response to copy others faithfully 
(e.g., Lyons, et al., 2007), as participants over-imitated both native and foreign speakers 
and did so whether the speakers were in the room or on video. In the present study, the 
native and foreign speakers were not present when the children were tested (in the “live” 
conditions” they left the room before testing); thus, it is unlikely that participants were 
over- imitating to affiliate with the demonstrator. However, the results do not completely 
rule out the fact that children could have had social goals in mind; children may have 
over-imitated to please the researcher, who remained in the room during testing.  
In contrast to children’s willingness to precisely imitate the speaker, neither the 3-
year-olds nor the 5-year-olds learned a novel word from a foreign speaker, even when she 
was present in the environment and the sole source of information. One interpretation is 
that preschool children consider the type of information a foreign speaker offers to 
determine if it is likely to be relevant to them as members of a cultural in-group (in this 
case, as members of a particular language community). Children may realize that a 
foreign speaker is not a good source of information for a new word (conventional 
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information decided upon by a language group), but is a perfectly fine source of 
information that is less conventional (such as how to use a new object).  
An alternative interpretation involves the task demands of learning a word from 
someone speaking another language. When offered a word by the Russian speaker, 
children had to hold in mind two pieces of novel linguistic information: the Russian 
phrase for “this one” (etet) and the novel label “fep or dax”. Children in our study already 
knew the English words, “this one” making it easier to focus on the new supposedly-
English label “fep or dax”; thus, the task may have been easier when it involved 
information offered by the English speaker. In line with an explanation based on task 
difficulty, 5-year-olds had no problem learning from the native speaker, whereas 3-year-
olds did not reliably learn a new word from either speaker. In a follow-up study, I will 
attempt to equate task difficulty in learning a novel label from a native or a foreign 
speaker (e.g., each speaker could utter only one label and then use non-verbal cues to 
indicate the referent — see Tomasello, et al., 1996). This will allow me to determine if 
children are actively monitoring the relevance of linguistic-vs-non-linguistic information 
offered by a person from a different language community.  
When forced to choose, neither 3-year-olds nor 5-year-olds reliably endorsed the 
English speaker’s use of a novel object. In fact, children were evenly split between 
copying the English speaker’s action, the Russian speaker’s action or neither speaker 
(e.g., they made up a new use for the object). This result demonstrates preschool 
children’s willingness to accept that a novel object can have multiple uses (e.g., see 
Birch, et al., 2008; Defeyter, et al., 2009). In contrast, Kinzler et al. (2011) reported that 
5-year-olds, when forced to choose, selectively endorsed novel object functions 
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demonstrated by native speakers. Because I also included word learning and preference 
tasks in the same study, I shortened the novel object endorsement task. First, I only tested 
children’s object use endorsement once. Kinzler and colleagues (2011) had four trials 
with different novel objects. Asking children multiple times about different objects might 
have increased children’s willingness to respond to at least a portion of the trials. I also 
did not preface the endorsement task in the typical way (in these studies, children first 
choose from whom they would like to gather information, and then are reminded of the 
information each speaker offered, before they are given a chance to respond). These 
procedural supports from the typical trust-in-information paradigm may increase 
participants’ responsiveness and allow for clear patterns to emerge over several trials. 
However, the fact that children in my study did not endorse the English speaker’s actions 
more often than those of the Russian speaker indicates that children do not automatically 
assume that a native speaker knows the only correct way to use a novel object. That is, 
even when a foreign speaker’s information conflicted with a native speaker’s, one-third 
of the participants in the current study learned and endorsed the foreign speaker’s action.  
 When forced to choose, preschool children may be more likely to expect a novel 
object to have only one “correct” label, than they are to expect it to have only one 
“correct” function. In line with this conclusion, 5-year-olds were more likely to endorse a 
native speaker’s label than a foreign speaker’s label for a novel object. Also, if children 
did not consider the speakers’ social-category information (language) at all, they should 
have chosen the novel label at chance, yet none of the 5-year-olds endorsed the Russian 
speaker’s label. Of interest, in the Live condition 6 (of 16) 5-year-olds did not want to 
choose (e.g., said “I don’t know”) when asked what the object was called, whereas none 
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of the 5-year-olds in the Video condition were unwilling to choose (they all endorsed the 
English speaker). One interpretation is that when a foreign speaker was in the room, right 
across from children, they had a harder time disregarding her information and thus could 
not decide on one “correct” label for the object. Without the typical “supports” (e.g., 
reminders, several iterations of questioning, etc.) used to test young preschoolers in trust-
in-information studies, our results for 3-year-olds differed from what is typically found 
(e.g., Pasquini, et al., 2007).  These younger children did not want to choose the label 
offered by one speaker over the label offered by the other (more than half did not endorse 
either label). Overall, 5-year-olds’ word learning on the forced-choice task does suggest 
that when a speaker’s social-category is obviously relevant to the information she is 
providing, children use her social category to selectively learn from a cultural in-group 
member. 
In the present study, when the speakers were present in the room, the number of 
children who preferred a native speaker was equal to the number who preferred a foreign 
speaker — as long as they were asked preference questions later, after interacting with 
speakers during the learning tasks.  When the speakers were on video, children chose 
equally between the two (regardless of when they were asked preference questions). 
Children who briefly saw the foreign and native speaker and then were immediately 
asked preference questions were the only ones to show an in-group preference.  This 
suggests that when children have no previous history to go on, and are presented with an 
unfamiliar person in their environment, they prefer the familiar. 
For the groups who waited to do the preference tasks, several factors may have 
contributed to their acceptance of the foreign speaker. First, they spent some with her — 
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approximately10 minutes in which she was in and out of the room for different learning 
tasks. However, a foreign speaker’s mere presence in the environment might not motivate 
children to “like” her more (i.e., if she simply came in the room but sat in a corner for 10 
minutes), although this could be experimentally tested. Additionally, the English-
speaking experimenter, the native (English) speaker, and the child’s parent did not 
express any alarm at the presence of the foreign speaker or shy away from her, thus 
implicitly accepting her as a perfectly fine person with whom to interact. Similarly, 
parents allowed their children to watch the video clips of the foreign speaker, and 
children may have taken this permission as an implicit approval of the people on the 
video.  Additionally, simply playing with the same toys as the foreign speaker (whether 
in person or with the same toys they saw her playing with on the video) during the 
imitation and word learning games may have encouraged young children to subsequently 
like her in the preference tasks.  
Of the three forced-choice preference tasks, the one that elicited the most in-group 
preferences by the children in the live condition was the “extra viewing” task, in which 
they had to pick which speaker they wanted to show them a toy. Children in the live 
condition who were given the “extra viewing” task before any extensive interaction with 
the foreign speaker may have viewed the outcome of this task as having a higher “cost” 
because they actually had to interact with their chosen speaker face-to-face. In contrast, 
video may offer a “safe” psychological distance (DeLoache, 2000) from which to 
experience people who are different from the self. Under these safe conditions, children 
in the video condition may have been curious to see a bit more of the foreign speaker: 
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They were equally likely to choose her or the English speaker for the “extra-viewing” 
task. 
Overall, the results of our study align with some social psychology research that 
overwhelmingly demonstrates the positive effects of intergroup contact in reducing 
prejudice (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006 for a meta-analysis).  Some factors in the current 
study are in line with those suggested by Allport (1954) to support the beneficial effects 
of intergroup contact, including the support of authorities (e.g., in this case the 
experimenter and children’s parents) as well as the presence of common goals (e.g., 
retrieval of the sticker, playing with the same toys).  Researchers have demonstrated that 
even vicarious extended experience with out-group individuals can reduce in-group 
biases, such as reading stories about in-group members befriending out-group members 
(Cameron et al., 2006) or having “parasocial” contact (seeing media portrayals of out-
group members and developing a feeling of affiliation with them – Schiappa, Gregg & 
Hewes, 2005).  Factors such as these may partly explain why, after being introduced to an 
individual “character” on video (i.e., the Russian speaker) in our study, children did not 
show an in-group bias.  
Of relevance to the “contact” explanation of our results, a mediator of the effect 
of intergroup contact is intergroup anxiety, which can potentially inhibit the positive 
effects of intergroup contact (Voci & Hewstone, 2003, as cited in Pettigrew & Tropp, 
2006).  In the present study, a few children showed evidence of anxiety (e.g., crying, 
running back to their parents) when the foreign speaker present in the room first began to 
talk.  In future studies, I could examine whether individual differences in young 
children’s response to novel individuals would mediate the effectiveness of intergroup 
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contact in reducing in-group biases.  Possibly, some children would be more likely to 
benefit, at least initially, from indirect contact. 
 In previous studies looking at children’s preferences for in-group speakers (using 
photos/audio clips of multiple exemplars of out-group members), young children on 
average have preferred native speakers.  For instance, Kinzler and her colleagues (2007) 
showed participants 8 pairs of speakers.  In contrast, children in our study were asked 
three times about one individual out-group speaker, and they were less likely to show an 
in-group bias.  When reasoning about one in-group speaker versus one out-group speaker, 
children may have been more focused on fairness than on group membership (e.g., 
choosing a native speaker on one task and then a foreign speaker on another).  In accord 
with this explanation, over half (55%) of the participants in the current study chose the 
out-group speaker on at least one of the three preference tasks.  Several researchers have 
demonstrated that children are often more concerned with fairness than group 
membership in experimental tasks (e.g., see Killen, Pisacane, Lee-Kim, & Ardila-Ray, 
2001, Schmidt et al., 2012).  
Overall, many children liked the Russian speaker, even when she was on video, 
but this did not transfer to liking unknown Russian speakers during the extension task, 
where participants were reasoning based on photos with accompanying audio clips. An 
in-group preference on the extension task only appeared when children were forced to 
choose.  5-year-olds in the present study were more likely to choose to play with 
unknown English speakers than non-native speakers, which replicates previous studies 
(e.g., Kinzler et al. 2007).  I also included a “One-speaker” extension task, in which 
participants rated unknown English and Russian speakers individually.  Five-year-olds 
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rated the English and Russian speakers equally; thus they did not demonstrate an in-
group bias.  An explanation for the divergent results across studies might be that an initial 
bias to prefer the familiar can be overcome when children are given experience with an 
individual out-group member (some research indicates even “parasocial” experience via 
video may be sufficient), or when they are asked about one individual at a time. 
Our results suggest that preferences are not necessarily linked to learning biases. 
Task order did not have an effect on children’s learning; “priming” children to like one 
speaker over the other by asking preference questions first did not affect children’s 
willingness to learn from a foreign speaker.  For instance, children who preferred the 
English speaker were not less likely to learn from the Russian speaker.  Thus we did not 
find evidence for a “halo” effect; preferring a speaker did not lead children to think she 
would be a better source of information than another speaker (See Brousseau-Laird and 
Birch’s 2010 study for the converse relation, in which 5-year-olds thought accurate 
informants would also be nice).  
Our results do not support the existence of a hard-wired mechanism by which 
children use a speaker’s language to form enduring preferences and to guide learning. 
The specificity of such a claim is problematic.  Many have suggested the possibility that 
evolution has endowed humans with a mechanism for reasoning about the social world; 
however, it is unlikely this mechanism was adapted for reasoning about specific social 
group divisions such as those based on language (e.g., Bigler & Liben, 2007; see also 
Atran’s and Gelman’s responses in Gil-White (2001)).  Researchers interested in social 
categorization are not unique in looking to evolutionary causes for individual behavior.  
Social learning theorists also have invoked evolutionary explanations for the distinctive 
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social cognitive abilities of humans (e.g., Csibra & Gergeley, 2006; Leslie, 1994; 
Tomasello, 1999).  Yet as Elman and colleagues (1996) write: 
it is certainly possible, indeed likely, that uniquely human activities have played 
 some role in the evolution of a uniquely human brain. This does not mean, 
 however, that we are entitled to leap directly from ‘special’ content to ‘special’ 
 mechanisms. (p. 361)  
 
 Using research methods from multiple disciplines may be one way to truly investigate 
how evolution may have contributed to human social cognition.  For example, 
neuroscience research can shed some light on what an adapted mechanism for reasoning 
about social groups might look like in the brain (e.g., as fMRI research has done for 
social behaviors such as processing faces — Kanwisher, McDermott & Chun, 1997).  Yet 
even identifying delineated brain regions specific to certain social behaviors does not 
offer definitive support for evolutionary adaptations, as it is still possible that evolution 
endowed humans with domain-general mechanisms that become highly specialized 
through early and sustained experience (e.g., Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & 
Gore, 1999).  Mesoudi (2009) calls for psychologists interested in evolutionary causes to 
consider Cultural Evolutionary Theory, an interdisciplinary field that attempts to link 
individual-level phenomena from psychology with population-level models used in 
anthropology (e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 2005, as cited in Mesoudi, 2009) to determine 
human behaviors that truly may have been adapted by evolution.  
Preschool children demonstrate both naïve sociological thinking (e.g., Hirschfeld, 
2001) and naïve psychological thinking (e.g., Wellman & Gelman, 1992), whether they 
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are endowed by evolution with specific insights and biases or simply learn these through 
early experience.  Children of this age use social group membership to guide their 
reasoning about other people (e.g., Diesendruck and haLevi, 2006; Hirschfeld, 1996). 
Despite the fact that children’s “theory of mind” (naïve psychology) has been a hot topic 
in psychology for several decades, Rhodes (2013) points out that research clearly 
demonstrates that “pre-school age children often weight the causal features specified by 
naïve sociology (e.g., categories, norms) more heavily than individual mental states (e.g., 
traits, desires) to predict individual action” (p. 1914).  However, preschool children use 
evidence of an individual’s mental state (e.g., his or her previous accuracy) to decide 
from whom to learn.  Thus when reasoning about someone’s trustworthiness as an 
information source, that person’s mental state may “trump” her social category. In our 
study, I gave children no mental state information about the speakers (e.g., previous 
accuracy or expertise), so children may have presumed that either speaker was a perfectly 
fine source of information.  The results of our study suggest that children do not rely on 
social-category information to guide learning (unless information is clearly conventional 
and they are forced to choose between conflicting sources), but I did not directly compare 
children’s use of social-category information to their use of individual mental state 
information.  One recent study has directly compared a speaker’s accuracy and 
information about that person’s social-category information (accent) and demonstrated 
that by the age of 4 years, children relied on a speaker’s accuracy to guide learning, 
regardless of her accent (Corriveau, Kinzler & Harris, 2013).  This finding was 
particularly striking because the informants offered novel label information (i.e., a 
domain in which one might expect a native speaker to be preferentially trusted). 
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Nevertheless, children still learned based on a speaker’s accuracy (not accent).  These 
results, along with those of the present study, cast doubt on previous claims that 
children’s attention to a speaker’s accent may systematically guide selective learning 
(Kinzler et al., 2011).  Children also privilege accuracy over age (another social 
category): young children trusted information provided by an accurate child over an 
inaccurate adult (Jaswal & Neely, 2006).  Therefore, when it comes to learning, young 
children may (wisely) attend to a prospective teacher’s mental state more than her social 
category. 
In our study, the only situation in which the children used a speaker’s social 
category to guide learning was when they were forced to choose between two conflicting 
labels for an object, a situation in which the speaker’s social category (language) was 
relevant to the information she was providing (an object label).  This finding suggests 
that children may use social-category information when deciding between informants for 
clearly relevant information.  However, the clear connection between a speaker’s 
language and word learning may be a highly salient social-category-to-information link 
that preschool children can easily recognize.  Or children may consider any social 
category (ethnicity, age, race, shirt-color) when deciding whether to trust an informant if 
the information being offered is noticeably linked to that specific social category.  For 
example, children trusted information provided by another child rather than an adult 
when the subject was how to operate a new toy (VanderBorght & Jaswal, 2009).  
Therefore, preschoolers may use social-category information as one characteristic 
(among many) to guide learning, but they may only do so when a speaker’s social 
category is clearly relevant to the information being shared.  Rather than “culturally-
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constrained” learners, I believe that preschoolers are flexible students of the social world, 
with the ability to discriminate among teachers if given clear reason to do so, but whose 
default is to trust the information provided to them.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Russian-English Translation of all Speaker Utterances in the Study 
 
Language Demonstration 
Привет, меня зовут Жаклина. 
“Hi! My name is Jaquelene” (or Eliz would say her name in Russian) 
Смотри, лошадка! Лошадка скачет галопом по столу. 
“Look, a horse! The horse is galloping on the table.” 
Смотри, черепаха! Черепаха скачет по моей руке.  
“Look, a turtle! The turtle is jumping on my hand.” 
Смотри, овец! Овец прыгает в ведре. Пока! 
“Look, a sheep! The sheep is jumping in the bucket. Bye!” 
 
“One-Speaker” Imitation Task 
Привет! Пока! 
“Hi! Bye!” 
 
Forced-Choice Imitation Task 
Я делаю это. Я Делаю это. 
“I do this. I do this.” 
 
“One-Speaker” Word Learning Task 
Ууу! Утка. Утка. Ууу! Машина. Машина. 
“ooo! Duck. Duck. ooo! Car. Car.” 
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Ууу! Fep! Fep! Ууу! Этот! Этот! 
“ooo! Fep! Fep!  Ooo! This one! This one!” (note, “fep” was counterbalanced with the 
word “dax”) 
Ууу! Ложка! Ложка. 
“Ooo! Spoon! Spoon.” 
Ложка? Ложка? 
“Spoon? Spoon?” 
Fep? Fep? 
“Fep? Fep?” 
 
Forced-Choice Word Learning Task 
Ууу! Время! Время! 
“Ooo vrema! Vrema!” (note, “vrema” was counterbalanced with the word “jukta”) 
 
“One-Speaker” Preference Task 
Привет! Хм, я хочу это! Пока! 
“Hi! hm, I want this one! Bye!” 
 
Forced-Choice Preference Task 
Я использую этот. 
“I use this one.” 
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